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and as a species. This speculative, poetic book also includes a photographic 
project by the author.
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and the challenge to human exceptionalism; and, on the other hand, 
the possibility of the extinction of life in the Anthropocene epoch.  The 
book presents a serious meditation on the meaning of the old ethical 
preoccupation—“how to live a good life?”—in an age when life itself is 
threatened with extinction.
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Chapter 1
Grounding
Life typically becomes an object of reflection when 
it is seen to be under threat. In particular, we humans 
have a tendency to engage in thinking about life 
(instead of just continuing to live it) when we are 
made to confront the prospect of death: be it the 
death of individuals due to illness, accident or old age; 
the death of whole ethnic or national groups in wars 
and other forms of armed conflict; but also of whole 
populations, be it human or nonhuman ones. Even 
though this book is first and foremost about life—
comprehended as both a biological and social phe-
nomenon—it is the narrative about the impending 
death of the human population, i.e., about the extinc-
tion of the human species, that provides a context for 
its argument. In contemporary popular science and 
mainstream media the problem of extinction is usually 
presented as something both inevitable and impend-
ing. To cite the British scientist Stephen Emmott, 
head of Microsoft’s Computational Science research 
and co-author of the book Ten Billion,1 the current 
situation in which the human species finds itself can 
be most adequately described with the phrase “we are 
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fucked”. The reasons for this supposed state of events 
are as follows:
Earth is home to millions of species. Just 
one dominates it. Us. Our cleverness, our 
inventiveness and our activities have mod-
ified almost every part of our planet. In 
fact, we are having a profound impact on 
it. Indeed, our cleverness, our inventive-
ness and our activities are now the drivers 
of every global problem we face. And every 
one of these problems is accelerating as we 
continue to grow towards a global popula-
tion of ten billion. In fact, I believe we can 
rightly call the situation we’re in right now 
an emergency—an unprecedented plan-
etary emergency. (non-pag.)
This unique situation, or rather geo-historical period, 
in which humans are said to have become the biggest 
threat to life on earth, has recently gained the moniker 
“Anthropocene”. Emmott’s practical solution to this 
situation is rather blunt: given that any possible tech-
nological or behavioral solutions to the current state 
of events, even if theoretically possible, are unlikely 
to work, the advice he would give his son would 
be to “buy a gun”. This is of course a powerful story, 
the goal of which is to shock and awe us into action. 
Without shooting our gun-wielding messenger, it is 
worth pointing out that there seems to be something 
both defeatist and narcissistic about jeremiads of this 
kind and those that tell them. Also, we humans have 
actually produced narratives about different forms of 
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apocalypse ever since we developed the ability to tell 
stories and record them. 
Rather than add to this catalogue, my aim in this 
book is to tell a different story about the world and 
our human positioning in and with it, while taking 
seriously what science has to say about life and death. 
I am mindful of philosopher John Gray’s admonition 
in his review of Emmott’s book that “The planet does 
not care about the stories that humans tell themselves; 
it responds to what humans do, and is changing irre-
versibly as a result” (6). Gray is no doubt correct in 
his skepticism. Yet it should be noted that we humans 
do care about the stories we tell ourselves. More 
importantly, stories have a performative nature: they 
can enact and not just describe things—even if there 
are of course limits to what they are capable of enact-
ing. This book is one such story about life and death 
at both macro and micro scales, shaped into a set of 
philosophical propositions for non-philosophers. 
More specifically, its aim is to outline a viable position 
on ethics as a way of living a good life when life itself is 
declared to be under a unique threat. In other words, 
it is a story about how we can live a good life at this 
precarious geo-historical moment—and about what 
constitutes such goodness. 
The injunction to outline some kind of “teaching 
of the good life” (Adorno 15) when life itself is said 
to be under threat comes to me partly from Theodor 
Adorno’s Minima Moralia, a 1944 slim volume by the 
Frankfurt philosopher written as a gift to his friend 
and collaborator Max Horkheimer, and subtitled 
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Reflections on a Damaged Life. On one level, Adorno’s 
diagnosis seems to be similar in tenor to Emmott’s:
Life has changed into a timeless succession 
of shocks, interspaced with empty, para-
lysed intervals. But nothing, perhaps, is 
more ominous for the future than the fact 
that, quite literally, these things will soon 
be past thinking on, for each trauma of 
the returning combatants, each shock not 
inwardly absorbed, is a ferment of future 
destruction. Karl Kraus was right to call 
his play The Last Days of Mankind. What is 
being enacted now ought to bear the title: 
“After Doomsday”. (54)
Yet the context of Adorno’s reflections, themselves 
presented in a series of fragments and what we might 
term “shards of thought”, is very unique: they spring 
from what he perceives as life’s catastrophic and 
irreparable destruction in the Holocaust. Bemoaning 
the fact that others are already envisaging the possi-
bility of “rebuilding culture” as if the murder of mil-
lions of Jews had been just an unpleasant interlude, he 
sees modern life as reduced “to the sphere of the pri-
vate and then merely consumption”, a state of events 
that leads to alienation and the withdrawal of vitality 
from life itself. Citing the Austrian writer Ferdinand 
Kürnberger, Adorno laments that “Life does not live”. 
But Adorno does not stop because of that: instead, he 
goes on looking for life’s traces buried in language, and 
for the possibility of continuing with critical thought 
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and writing, with a determination to teach us about 
“the good life”, even if on a very small scale.
My own project on minimal ethics draws inspira-
tion from Adorno’s persistence in Minima Moralia to 
keep philosophizing as if against all odds, to look for 
signs of life in the middle of an apocalypse, even if 
my own context and the existential threats that shape 
it are very different from his. The ambition and ori-
entation of my ethical propositions also differ from 
Adorno’s: even though I embrace the critical spirit of 
his work, I turn to various philosophies of life as well 
as feminist thought in order to outline a more affirma-
tive framework for the times when life is said to find 
itself under threat on a planetary scale. My aim here 
is for us to consider to what extent we can make life 
go on and also how we ourselves can continue to 
live it well, while interrogating what it means “to live 
life well”, and whether such a consensus can actu-
ally be reached.
It needs to be signaled right from the start that 
the very “we” of the argument that will ensue is also 
already posited as a problem, referring as it does to 
what philosophy and common sense have designated 
as “humans” but also opening onto a complex and 
dynamic network of relations in which “we humans” 
are produced as humans and in which we remain 
entangled with nonhuman entities and processes. 
The seeds of this book were originally planted dur-
ing the preparations for a wedding of ecosex artists 
Beth Stephens and Annie Sprinkle, who married Lake 
Kallavesi—which is part of the Iso-Kalla lake system 
in Northern Savonia—at the ANTI Contemporary 
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Art Festival in Kuopio, Finland, on September 30, 
2012. (I wrote a short piece on minimal ethics as a 
wedding gift for them.) This human-nonhuman wed-
ding between more than two parties was not Stephens 
and Sprinkle’s first: in previous ceremonies they had 
married the Earth, the Sea, the Snow and the Rocks, 
thus playfully taking on and enacting the naturocul-
tural kinship in which love is not enough. Stephens 
and Sprinkle’s performance serves for me as an entry 
point into a different mode of philosophizing, one 
that borrows from artistic sensibilities and that pro-
duces ideas with things and events rather than just 
with words. This mode of philosophical production 
is necessarily fragmented: it gives up on any desire to 
forge systems, ontologies or worlds and makes itself 
content with minor, even if abundant, interventions 
into material and conceptual unfoldings. A minimal 
ethics outlined throughout this book is one such pos-
sible intervention.
The mode of working employed in this book 
mobilizes what could be termed “a post-masculinist 
rationality”, a more speculative, less directional mode 
of thinking and writing. This notion develops from 
Darin Barney’s concept of post-masculinist courage. 
For Barney, “courage that is post-masculinist is not 
necessarily therefore feminine (or even really post-mas-
culine—though it is very likely to be feminist)” (non-
pag.). Barney’s call is in turn inspired by political the-
orist Wendy Brown, who has outlined a vision for “a 
post-masculinist politics” in which freedom is recon-
ciled with love and recognition. Such politics requires 
“much courage and willingness to risk” (Brown 202). 
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Barney suggests this sort of courage needs to be distin-
guished from “the sort of bravado whereby men seek 
to exert control over everything around them by the 
force of instrumental rationality” (non-pag.). Post-
masculinist courage involves for him “the courage to 
face the uncertainty of that which we cannot control; 
[...] the courage to be let go into action that begins 
something truly new and unpredictable” (non-pag.). 
A post-masculinist rationality is by no means non- or 
anti-rationalist; it just calls for a different modulation 
of rationality, one that remains more attuned to its 
own modes of production. It is always already embod-
ied and immersed, responding to the call of matter 
and to its various materializations—materializations 
such as humans, animals, plants, inanimate objects, 
as well as the relations between them. Such post-
masculinist rationality remains suspicious towards 
any current attempts to (re)turn to ontology, in both 
its idealist and materialist guises, as a predominant 
mode of philosophizing. It sees any such attempts for 
what they are: ways of producing and hence also mas-
tering “the world” and then passing it on (as fact) to 
others—even if such ontological production is to be 
dressed in the language of immanence and autopoi-
esis. (My suspicion towards ontology does not mean I 
do not believe there are “things” out there beyond the 
realm of the human and beyond the human concep-
tualization of them. However, as soon as the human 
takes to the human-centric practice of philosophizing, 
“things” immediately become far less objective, realist 
and “out there” than this human would often like, or 
would like others to believe.)
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The reflections offered in this short book are 
linked to my previous work on what it means to live 
a good life at a time when the very notion of life is 
undergoing a radical reformulation, both on a philo-
sophical and biotechnological level. However, I am 
less concerned here with a critical discussion of dif-
ferent theoretical positions on ethics and more with 
sketching out an affirmative proposal for an ethics that 
makes sense—and that senses its own making. This idea 
of the ethical call of the universe, in its temporary sta-
bilizations, expands on my argument from Bioethics in 
the Age of New Media, in which I positioned bioethics 
as an originary philosophy, situated even before ontol-
ogy. That idea was inspired by the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, although I was—and still am—troubled by 
the humanist limitations of Levinas’ ethics, whereby 
primordial responsibility exerted upon me always 
comes from human others. In bioethics as an “ethics 
of life” the way I understand it, the human self has to 
respond to an expanded set of obligations that affect 
her, make an impression on her, allow for her differ-
entiation from the world around her and demand a 
response that is not just a reaction. While I do rec-
ognize, together with other theorists of post-anthro-
pocentric thought, that “it is not all about us”,2 I also 
acknowledge the singular human responsibility which 
is exercised both by philosophical theory (which is 
consciously undertaken by few) and by philosophical 
practice (which is a much more widespread undertak-
ing, even if not always a conscious one). This recog-
nition hopefully justifies to some extent the reluctant 
yet also sometimes inevitable use of the pronoun “I” 
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throughout this volume, and the multiple paradoxes 
implied in any attempt on the part of a singular female 
human writer to author a post-anthropocentric eth-
ics. The post-anthropocentric ethics of expanded 
obligations becomes a way of taking responsibility, 
by the human, for various sorts of thickenings of the 
universe, across different scales, and of responding to 
the tangled mesh of everyday connections and rela-
tions. To do this, I shall go back to Levinas for inspi-
ration, but also cross-pollinate him with other ideas 
with the help of some Brilliant Bees: (Henri) Bergson, 
(Karen) Barad, (Rosi) Braidotti, (Wendy) Brown 
and ( Jane) Bennett, as well as some other mem-
bers of the Philosophical Hive Mind (Tom Cohen, 
Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, 
Donna Haraway, Tim Ingold, Stanisław Lem and 
Timothy Morton).
If the mode of working in this book embraces a 
post-masculinist rationality, its method—in a depar-
ture from a modernist form of critique—can be 
loosely described as “critical vitalism”. This method 
involves rethinking and remaking “life” and what we 
can do with it. Taking life as a (yet) non-valorized 
minimal condition, critical vitalism remains attuned 
to stoppages in life, seeing life as both a becoming and 
a fracturing process. Claire Colebrook articulates this 
dual, productive-destructive tendency of life, in the 
following terms: “Philosophy cannot simply decide 
to begin from ground zero; nor can the living being 
become so open and receptive to its milieu that it 
would not inflect, pervert or fold its passions around 
its own life. Immanence is an ongoing struggle, and 
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the aims of becoming-imperceptible, seeing the world 
anew or becoming-child are given force and power 
just through the resistances they encounter” (2010: 
166). Critical vitalism entails knowing the difference 
of difference. It considers how differences ensue and 
matter, who they matter to, how matter resists and 
recoils, and to what effect. Starting from the premise 
that “everything is interconnected” (Morton 2010: 1), 
it also considers differentiation within those processes 
of connectivity while offering a reflection on human 
situatedness in and responsibility for different con-
nections of relations of which s/he is part. Situated at 
the crossroads of cultural theory, media and cultural 
studies, continental philosophy and art, the book 
inscribes itself in the trajectory of what Timothy 
Morton has called “the ecological thought”. Yet, still 
following Morton, this is a curious kind of ecology, 
as it is not based on any prelapsarian, romanticized 
notion of Nature that can allegedly be recouped in 
order to make the world and our lives in it better.
Let me explain at last what it thus means for the 
ethical framework outlined here to be pointed, via 
the preposition “for” included in the book’s title, 
towards the geo-historical period described as “the 
Anthropocene”. Proposed by the Dutch chemist Paul 
Crutzen in 2000, the term “Anthropocene” (from 
anthropo, man, and cene, new) serves as a name for 
a new geological epoch that supposedly follows the 
Holocene, “the epoch that began at the end of the 
last ice age, 11,700 years ago, and that—officially, 
at least—continues to this day” (Kolbert 29). The 
need for the new term is being justified by the fact 
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that human influence upon the geo- and biosphere 
via processes such as farming, deforestation, min-
ing and urbanization, to name but a few, has been so 
immense that it actually merits a new designation in 
order to address the challenges raised by that influ-
ence. Even though the term has not been universally 
and unquestioningly adopted by all geologists, its use 
has significantly increased over the last decade—and 
has been popularized beyond the professional sci-
entific community thanks to the 2011 article on the 
topic by Elizabeth Kolbert in the National Geographic 
magazine. Yet even amongst those who are sympa-
thetic to the term there is widespread doubt as to 
which moment in time should serve as a beginning 
of this epoch: some point to the early days of agri-
culture some 8,000 years ago, others to the Industrial 
Revolution or to the last fifty years of excessive con-
sumption, while still others see the Anthropocene as 
an epoch that is yet to come. 
Significantly, in the opening pages of his Ecological 
Thought Morton claims that “One of the things that 
modern society has damaged, along with ecosystems 
and species and the global climate, is thinking” (4). 
The Anthropocene can therefore perhaps be seen as 
articulating, alongside the ecological disasters, this 
crisis of critical thinking. My own use of the term 
“Anthropocene” in this book is first and foremost as 
an ethical pointer rather than as a scientific descrip-
tor. In other words, the Anthropocene serves here 
as a designation of the human obligation towards 
the geo- and biosphere, but also towards thinking 
about the geo- and biosphere as concepts. The ethics 
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for the Anthropocene would therefore entail a call 
for a return to critical thinking, for a reparation of 
thought. Combining inventiveness with criticality, 
it would promote non-instrumental modes of think-
ing, while avoiding easy solutionism and what some 
theorists have called the derangement of scale (see 
Clark; Kember and Zylinska), whereby filling in half 
a kettle is perceived as “doing one’s bit for the environ-
ment”. Yet, even if the Anthropocene is about “the age 
of man”, the ethical thinking it designates is strongly 
post-anthropocentric, as indicated earlier, in the sense 
that it does not consider the human to be the domi-
nant or the most important species, nor does is see the 
world as arranged solely for human use and benefit. 
The term does however entail an appeal to human sin-
gularity (not to be confused with human supremacy), 
coupled with a recognition that we can make a differ-
ence to the ongoing dynamic processes taking in the 
biosphere and the geosphere—of which we are part. 
Minimal ethics for the Anthropocene is not just 
an updated form of environmental ethics: it does not 
pivot on any coherent notion of an “environment” (or, 
as mentioned earlier, “nature”) as an identifiable entity 
but rather concerns itself with dynamic relations 
between entities across various scales such as stem 
cells, flowers, dogs, humans, rivers, electricity pylons, 
computer networks, and planets, to name but a few. 
This is why the closest way of describing this kind of 
minimal ethics would be as an ethics of life, with life 
understood both philosophically and biologically. Its 
starting premise is that we humans are making a dif-
ference to the arrangements of what we are calling 
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“the world”. Naturally, we are not the only or even the 
most important actors that are making such a differ-
ence. It would be extremely naive and short-sighted 
to assume that, as it would be to proclaim that we can 
affect or control all occurrences within that world—
but we are perhaps uniquely placed to turn the mak-
ing of such difference into an ethical task. Thanks to 
our human ability to tell stories and to philosophize, 
we can not only grasp the deep historical stratifica-
tion of values through an involvement in what Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari called “a geology of mor-
als” (1987) but also work out possibilities for making 
better differences across various scales. While our par-
ticipation in the differentiation of matter is ongoing, 
frequently collective or distributed, and often uncon-
scious, ethics names a situation when those processes 
of differentiation are accounted for—when they occur 
as a cognitive-affective effort to rearrange the solidi-
fied moral strata, with a view to producing a better 
geo-moral landscape.
The ethics discussed here is minimal in the sense 
that it is non-systemic (i.e., it does not remain rooted 
in any large conceptual system) and non-normative 
(which is to say, it does not rest on any fixed prior 
values, nor does it postulate any firm values in the 
process). Inevitably, for some readers a non-norma-
tive ethics will be a non sequitur, a conceptual blind 
alley that will not deliver what it promises. For me, 
in turn, non-normativity is the only possible way of 
thinking ethics and life generally in a responsible and 
non-hubristic way, from amidst life itself. But, wary of 
capital-V values, I nevertheless embark on this project 
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with one minimal assumption: a conviction that we 
have a responsibility to engage with life—materi-
ally and conceptually—because, as we know from 
Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living” 
(Plato Apology, 38a, non-pag.). What counts as the 
examination of life goes beyond the Socratic method 
of inquiry instantiated between two parties with a 
view to eliminating erroneous hypotheses. It also 
involves physicalist engagement with the matter of 
life, with its particles and unfoldings. 
The minimalism of the ethics project presented 
in this book does not just refer to the premises of its 
main argument but also to its content. Aimed as an 
exercise in brevity, the book adopts a formal structure 
that comprises ten short essays, each one presenting 
one argument or proposition. The aim here is to say 
just enough. The book also contains a photographic 
project, Topia daedala, which arises out of ongoing 
efforts on my part to “do philosophy” with different 
media. While the project draws on selected philo-
sophical standpoints, as well some ideas from physics, 
biology, neuroscience, sociology, anthropology, and 
cultural and media theory, academic references have 
been kept brief. The argument is constructed on the 
basis of a spiral, with ideas being introduced across the 
subsequent theses and then returned to and expanded 
on. Linear reading may be one way of getting through 
the book. Yet, given that each chapter constitutes a 
small essay in it its own right, entering the book at any 
point may offer a different reading experience, intro-
ducing the reader to this minimal ethics in medias res. 
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In medias res can actually serve as a description of the 
location of our minimal ethics.
Notes
1. The book arose from a successful lecture-play at the 
Royal Court in London in which Emmott took part in 
the summer of 2012.
2. This is a frequent mantra of various theorists of post-
anthropocentric thought, principally the followers of 
actor-network theory and object-oriented ontology: it is 
even included in the dedication of Levi R. Bryant’s The 
Democracy of Objects.
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Chapter 2
Scale
The minimal ethics posited in this book needs to be 
thought on a universal scale. This may sound like a 
paradox, yet it will only seem so if we rush ahead of 
ourselves and expect such ethics to furnish us with 
some generally applicable principles that will have to 
remain valid across all times and locales. But we have 
said nothing of the kind. By speaking of the universal 
scale we are merely attempting to situate our philo-
sophical endeavors meaningfully and responsibly, 
without foreclosing them all too early by the kind of 
thinking that would carve out entities such as “the ani-
mal”, “the body” and “the gene”, and locations such as 
“the world”, “Africa” and “the lab”, and then attempt to 
work out good ways of managing relations between 
them. The universal starting point assumes the shared 
materiality of the universe, which is another way of 
saying that everything is made of the same stuff—
although not necessarily in the same way. And yet, 
as explained by Stephen W. Hawking, “Despite the 
fact that the universe is so uniform and homoge-
neous on a large scale, it contains local irregularities, 
such as stars and galaxies. These are thought to have 
developed from small differences in the density of 
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the early universe from one region to another” (122). 
The preceding statements already posit this somewhat 
imaginary entity, the universe, which includes plan-
ets, galaxies and the space between them, or, putting 
it differently, all matter and energy that exists, or that 
is actively transmuting and interrelating. The universe 
thus serves as a fictitious point of unity for an ongo-
ing process of the unfolding of matter across time 
and space that supposedly started around 13.82 bil-
lion years ago, with an event we have retrospectively 
called “the Big Bang”. (Even though ongoing, this pro-
cess will one day come to a halt. There could have also 
been other events and processes before the Big Bang, 
but we do not know anything about them.) 
The term “scale”, from Latin scala, means “ladder”: 
it is a practical and conceptual device that allows us 
to climb up and down various spatiotemporal dimen-
sions in order to see things from different viewpoints. 
Adopting a universal scale is therefore inevitably a 
dynamic process. It involves coming to terms with 
time understood, after Bergson, as “duration”, a contin-
uous flow into which we as observers make insertions 
in order to carve out some “solids” from it, to tempo-
rarily stabilize matter into entities. In an attempt to 
grasp the passage of time, we make incisions in it with 
our proprioceptive and cognitive apparatuses, and 
then pass off the products of these incisions as images 
of the world. Bringing (back) the universal scale will 
thus serve as a reminder for us that there is an excess 
to our acts of world-making and that it is perhaps 
imprudent or even irresponsible to forget about it in 
all kinds of discussions—those concerning politics, 
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ethics or even our everyday existence. Timothy Clark 
points out that considerations of scale tend to under-
mine many policies, concepts and common-sense 
beliefs about what we refer to as “our world”, since any 
efforts to conduct environmental reform in one coun-
try, say, may be effectively negated by the lack of any 
such efforts in many other (frequently more power-
ful, wealthier and more environmentally damaging) 
locations of the globe. This forgetting of scale results 
in what Clark calls “a derangement of linguistic and 
intellectual proportion”, whereby filling the kettle with 
just enough water to make tea or buying a slightly less 
petrol-guzzling make of car are seen as ways of “saving 
the planet”. Yet it is not only many eco-activists and, 
more broadly, those who care about the environment 
and climate change, that suffer from this kind of sca-
lar derangement. The latter malady also affects many 
scholars in the humanities, including those occupy-
ing themselves with problems of ethics and morality. 
Adopting a similarly mechanistic approach to this pre-
sumed entity they alternatively call “the planet” and 
“the world”, humanities thinkers of various theoretical 
persuasions in various disciplines first posit and locate 
this entity at a distance, and then try to act on it. This 
leads Clark to conclude that “dominant modes of lit-
erary and cultural criticism are blind to scale effects 
in ways that now need to be addressed” (150). The 
problem with this “planetary” mode of thinking lies in 
the apparent grasping of complexity, which is nothing 
more but a form of reductionism, whereby “[r]eceived 
concepts of agency, rationality and responsibility 
are being strained or even begin to fall apart into a 
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bewildering generalizing of the political that can make 
even filling a kettle as public an act as voting” (151). 
My attempt to outline a minimal ethics thought across 
a universal scale offers a partial response to Clark’s 
exhortation to consider scale effects seriously.
The preceding argument hopefully explains to 
some extent why the minimal ethics outlined in this 
book needs to work on a universal scale. Once again, 
this is not to say that such ethics needs to be applicable 
across all times and locales: it just needs to acknowl-
edge the temporally and spatially unbound perspec-
tive of “the universe” that circumscribes how relations, 
entities and phenomena appear to us. It also confirms 
our specific locatedness in space and time from which 
we will conduct our enquiry. If we then continue to 
philosophize, proselytize or moralize about the world, 
we will have registered that we are doing it from a 
uniquely situated (even if inherently unstable) stand-
point, on a certain selected, historically legitimized 
scale. Bringing back universality, which is a form of 
McLuhanian “all-at-onceness”,3 as a horizon of our 
enquiry can therefore actually act as a reminder to us 
of the partiality of a story we can tell, or of an inter-
vention we can make—but also of the locatedness of 
the many concepts and values we humans have devel-
oped across all kinds of constrained historical scales. 
An attempt to grasp a phenomenon as complex as, 
say, climate change across various scales may lead to 
a challenge “to basic dominant assumptions about the 
nature and seeming self-evident value of ‘democracy’ 
as the most enlightened way to conduct human affairs” 
(Clark 152). Thinking at scales that intuitively used to 
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“make sense” may actually turn out to be, according 
to Clark, “a form of intellectual and ethical contain-
ment. […] Viewed on very long time scales, human 
history and culture can take on unfamiliar shapes, 
[…] altering conceptions of what makes something 
‘important’ and what does not. Nonhuman entities 
take on a decisive agency” (159). Acknowledging this 
means being called to reconsider our notions of poli-
tics and ethics beyond the conventional liberal and 
human/ist bounds and templates—in the light of the 
recognition that “it is not all about us”—even if the 
act of theorizing and reflecting on such politics and 
ethics itself is to remain, at least for the time being, a 
uniquely human task.
An invitation to look at things on a universal scale 
is also meant as an encouragement for us to swap the 
telescope for the microscope,4 to change perspective 
from the universal to the quantum, in order to try 
and see otherwise—without losing sight of the com-
plex entanglements of matter, and us as matter, across 
various ways, and of the fact that we are not really 
able to “see” much at either end of the physical spec-
trum. The notion of entanglement is used here in the 
specific sense given to it by Karen Barad, for whom 
“Existence is not an individual affair”. According to 
Barad, “Individuals do not preexist their interactions; 
rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their 
entangled intra-relating” (ix). From this perspective, 
the notion of scale cannot be seen as an external mea-
suring stick that can be objectively applied to time and 
space but is rather part of the phenomena it attempts 
to measure, as “time and space, like matter and 
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meaning, come into existence, are iteratively recon-
figured through each intra-action, thereby making 
it impossible to differentiate in any absolute sense 
between creation and renewal, beginning and return-
ing, continuity and discontinuity” (ix). The ontol-
ogy of the world is therefore that of entanglement. It 
entails the constant unfolding of matter across time—
but also a temporary stabilization of matter into 
entities (or rather, things “we” and other nonhuman 
“beings” recognize as entities) in order to execute cer-
tain acts and perform certain tasks. Only very few of 
these acts will be pre-planned and conscious. Yet it is 
precisely this perhaps rather narrow domain of at least 
partly conscious activity undertaken by entangled 
beings who have historically allocated to themselves 
the name “humans” that becomes a field of action for 
the minimal ethics outlined here.
This mode of thinking on a universal scale might 
seem to be seamlessly and unproblematically aligned 
with other modes of “big thinking” currently en 
vogue, such as big history or ubiquitous computing. 
Yet, in their upscaling and downscaling efforts, the 
latter approaches more often than not turn out to be 
just not deep enough because they overlook too much 
in the process. This is why Sarah Kember and I, in our 
article “Media Always and Everywhere: A Cosmic 
Approach”, have drawn on a principle that postulates 
the “just right” size or amount to be applied in each 
particular case, while not losing sight of the wider hori-
zon. Called “the Goldilocks principle”, this thought 
device is used in fields such as computing, biology or 
economics to suggest that a given phenomenon needs 
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to remain within certain margins and avoid reaching 
extremes. The term is developed from a children’s 
story “The Three Bears”, in which a little girl named 
Goldilocks sneaks into a house inhabited by three 
furry creatures, trying to make herself comfortable 
in it. On identifying the “just right” porridge, chair 
and bed, the trespassing little proto-feminist is made 
to face the irate bears, who chase her away from their 
house. For Kember and me, Goldilocks inscribes itself 
in the long line of feminist figurations such as “the 
cyborg” or “the nomad” proposed by thinkers such as 
Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti.5 The cyborg and 
the nomad tread foreign territories as uninvited guests 
with a view to outlining an alternative political imagi-
nary. The role of Goldilocks in thinking on the univer-
sal scale is to make us aware of our own derangements 
when sliding up and down the historical or even geo-
logical pole all too smoothly, to recognize some block-
ages on it, and to add some stoppage points herself. 
It is therefore to provide a “just right” assessment of 
universality. 
A Goldilocks-controlled universality can help us 
enact the post-masculinist rationality mentioned in 
the first chapter, which is a form of rationality that, in 
acknowledging the multiscalar properties of the uni-
verse, eschews any attempts to collapse those scales 
in order to tell a totalizing story about it. A minimal 
ethics thus envisaged is thus inevitably a form of prag-
matics. It involves recognizing, as well as undertaking, 
pragmatic temporary stabilizations of time and mat-
ter. Minimal ethical statements can be understood as 
articulations, from Latin articulatio (“separation into 
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joints”), as they both link things together and enact 
a separation between them in order to say something 
about the relations of the world, and about our pos-
sible modest contribution to developing and man-
aging those relations. Ethical articulations therefore 
always perform an ontological function: they stabilize 
and organize the universe for us, but in a way that is 
to benefit not just us but also the universe as such. It is 
in this sense that ethics precedes ontology: not on a 
linear scale but rather in the sense of making a prior 
demand on us.
Seeing things across different scales is more than 
an attempt to represent the universe: it actively pro-
duces entities and relations. It is in this sense that 
seeing is already a “doing” (Barad 51), with concepts 
being understood as “specific physical arrangements”, 
not “mere ideations” (54). Such an approach makes of 
theorizing “an embodied practice, rather than a spec-
tator sport of matching linguistic representations to 
pre-existing things” (Barad 54). Consequently, the 
minimal ethics I am outlining here needs to be an 
embedded and embodied practice; it needs to involve 
a material working out of the relations between enti-
ties and of their varying forces, instead of relying on a 
priori systemic normativity. True to its name though, 
it does adopt some minimal principles, the first one 
of which is the recognition of the entangled position-
ing of the human in, or rather with, the universe and a 
uniquely human responsibility for that universe. That 
responsibility is also minimal, in the sense that it does 
not involve any pre-decided values and rules. It only 
carries an injunction to mobilize the human faculties 
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of reasoning and sensing, and of articulating thoughts 
and affects through the historically outlined practice 
of philosophy (or, more specifically, ethics as a prac-
tice of both value formation and reflection on it), in 
order to respond to the processes and relations of the 
universe—some of which may directly involve the 
human. This inherent connectedness of the universe 
should not be understood as “linkages among preex-
isting nested scales but as the agential enfolding of dif-
ferent scales through one another (so that, for exam-
ple, the different scales of individual bodies, homes, 
communities, regions, nations, and the global are not 
seen as geometrically nested in accordance with some 
physical notion of size but rather are understood as 
being intra-actively produced through one another)” 
(Barad 245). The notion of intra-action—as opposed 
to the concept of “interaction”, which assumes an 
encounter before previously stabilized entities—
points to the inherent dynamism of matter, which 
only “becomes something” in relation to something 
else, over and over again. Naturally, the majority of 
such intra-actions across different scales are beyond 
human ken. Minimal ethics refers precisely to this very 
narrow spectrum of the universe’s intra-actions for 
which the human is able to take at least some degree 
of responsibility—materially, conceptually and mor-
ally. It is this partial ability to do this, rather than a prior 
resolution of how to do it, that serves as a tiny corner-
pebble of our minimal ethics for the Anthropocene.
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Notes
3. “Today, the instantaneous world of electric information 
media involves all of us, all at once. Ours is a brand-new 
world of all-at-onceness. Time, in a sense, has ceased 
and space has vanished”, McLuhan on McLuhanism, 
WNDT Educational Broadcasting Network, 1966.
4. “Gazing out into the night sky or deep down into the 
structure of matter, with telescope or microscope in 
hand, Man reconfirms his ability to negotiate immense 
differences in scale in the blink of an eye. Designed 
specifically for our visual apparatus, telescopes and 
microscopes are the stuff of mirrors, reflecting what is 
out there. Nothing is too vast or too minute. Though 
a mere speck, a blip on the radar screen of all that is, 
Man is the center around which the world turns. Man 
is the sun, the nucleus, the fulcrum, the unifying force, 
the glue that holds it all together. Man is an individual 
apart from all the rest. And it is this very distinction 
that bestows on him the inheritance of distance, a 
place from which to reflect—on the world, his fellow 
man, and himself. A distinct individual, the unit of all 
measure, finitude made flesh, his separateness is the key. 
Representationalism, metaphysical individualism, and 
humanism work hand in hand, holding this worldview 
in place. These forces have such a powerful grip on 
contemporary patterns of thought that even some of 
the most concerted efforts to escape the grasp of these 
anthropocentric forces have failed” (Barad 134). 
5. See Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs and Women and Braidotti, 
Nomadic Subjects.
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Chapter 3
Process
There has been a tendency in recent years amongst 
cultural theorists of various ilk to speak about process 
and relationality as the dominant modes of captur-
ing the unstable ontology of what we conventionally 
refer to as “the world”. So-called process philosophy, 
expounded by thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Gilles Deleuze or A.N. Whitehead, foregrounds 
change as the key aspects of the becoming of the mat-
ter of the world—and of our becoming material in the 
world. The world itself, as we will discuss later on, is 
seen here as nothing more than a temporary mental 
organization, undertaken by the spatially embedded 
and embodied human, of the various processes of 
which this human is part. Process philosophy postu-
lates what could be described as a “fluid ontology”, 
where being is not defined through substances with 
their supposedly inherent and immutable properties 
but is rather seen as dynamic and constantly chang-
ing. Even though the roots of process philosophy can 
be traced back to the ideas of the Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus, with his theory of the universal flux, this 
philosophical framework has always constituted a 
more marginal line of thinking within the Western 
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epistemic edifice. Yet processual thinking has recently 
gained a new lease of life through its (not always 
unproblematic) encounters with scientific develop-
ments in quantum physics, cosmology and molecu-
lar biology, developments that point to the inherent 
instability and changeability of the universe at both 
particle and cosmic level. The growing interest in 
process philosophy can be seen as an attempt to over-
come the inherent bias of Western metaphysics, which 
has shaped many static concepts and assumptions that 
underpin our language and worldview.
The argument developed in this book remains 
aligned with the processual mode of thinking about 
what our language traditionally describes as “reality”, 
but it also stays attuned to the possible disruptions to 
the flow of life encapsulated by this framework—even 
if it does not go all the way towards replacing the pro-
cessual framework with a (so-called) object-oriented 
one. Yet it is these disruptions to the process that, first, 
allow us to see the process as a process, and, second, 
that make the process interesting as an event. It is pre-
cisely through these disruptions that life gets tempo-
rarily stabilized, that it presents itself to us as a series 
of states and objects. Many process philosophers do 
in fact acknowledge that “there are temporally stable 
and reliably recurrent aspects of reality. But they take 
such aspects of persistence to be the regular behavior 
of dynamic organizations that arise due to the con-
tinuously ongoing interaction of processes” (Seibt 
non-pag.). It is important to recognize that these 
temporary stabilizations, which can be described as 
cuts made to the flow of life, occur both at the level of 
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matter and (human) mind. Some of these cuts are, 
to use Karen Barad’s term, “agential”, which is to say 
they enact “a resolution within the phenomenon of 
the inherent ontological (and semantic) indetermi-
nacy” (140)—although not all of these agential cuts 
have a corresponding human agent that enacts them. 
The recognition of the outcomes of those cuts is an 
epistemological activity: this is how we make sense, 
cognitively and affectively, of the chaos of the world. 
The act of taking responsibility for those, perhaps rare, 
cuts which we humans are capable of enacting (or not 
enacting) is in turn what I am defining throughout 
this book as an ethical endeavor.
Henri Bergson is one of the process philosophers 
who can be of help to us in getting to grips with the 
process-entity dualism. His Creative Evolution is an 
attempt to encourage us to overcome the fossilized 
habits of our mind. The mind inevitably spatializes 
time by cutting its flow into what he calls solids, thus 
making us miss out on the true essence of life, or what 
we might call its lifeness. Indeed, for Bergson, our 
intellect is unable to grasp true duration because it is 
only at home working on inert matter, but the flow of 
time requires us to adjust its somewhat mechanical 
working (169). “If our existence were composed of 
separate states with an impassive ego to unite them, 
for us there would be no duration”, writes Bergson 
(6). Bergson’s philosophy of time is therefore primar-
ily intuitive or, we might even say, experiential, a point 
he articulates in his restatement of the Heraclitean 
river dilemma: “consciousness cannot go through the 
same state twice” (8). For Bergson, time and duration 
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provide the organizing logic of the universe, a thought 
he expresses as follows: “the truth is that we change 
without ceasing, and that the state itself is nothing but 
change” (4). To deal with this incessant duration, we 
need to turn to intuition to recapture a more instinc-
tual way of grasping life that allows us to apprehend 
that which is in process. Yet Bergson’s observation 
that “No doubt, it is useful to us, in view of our ulterior 
manipulation, to regard each object as divisible into 
parts arbitrarily cut up, each part being again divisible 
as we like, and so on ad infinitum” (169-70) signals a 
certain inevitable if reluctant pragmatism entailed in 
his argument, one that brings up states even if in order 
to debunk them.
The differentiation between process and entity is 
itself premised on the possibility of the human step-
ping outside the world she is describing in order to 
say something about it. However, this is not to say 
that process is all that is. It is rather to recognize that 
“process” and “entity” are terms we humans use to 
describe, however clumsily, the different speeds and 
scales at which the transformations of matter are tak-
ing place in the universe—and to acknowledge that 
these transformations matter to us humans in differ-
ent ways. Derrida makes a similar point when reply-
ing to Bernard Stiegler in Echographies of Television 
in their discussion of the technical process and what 
it involves (incidentally, for Stiegler as much as for 
Derrida, techne is originary to life, including human 
life, rather than being a mere product of human activ-
ity). Derrida says: “to speak of a technical process, and 
indeed of its acceleration, mustn’t lead us to overlook 
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the fact that this flux, even if it picks up speed, none-
theless passes through determined phases and struc-
tures” (76). He is concerned with the way the term 
“process” tends to be used as a “pretext for saying: 
It’s a flow, a continuous development; there is nothing 
but process” (76). Consistent with the deconstruc-
tive logic that shapes his philosophical endeavor, one 
that shows seemingly opposing terms as each other’s 
conditions of possibility when they emerge as part of 
our human discourse in the shape of tools that help us 
make sense of the world, Derrida insists: “No, there is 
not only process. Or at least, process always includes 
stases, states, halts” (76). This kind of argument has 
been branded “correlationist” by Quentin Meillassoux 
and other proponents of the recently fashionable spec-
ulative realism, in the sense that humans are seem-
ingly unable to envisage the world in isolation from 
themselves and their own concerns. Yet this is nothing 
of the kind. The world (or rather what we are calling 
the world) does of course unfold and act in a myriad 
ways outside and beyond us, many of which we are 
unable to see, experience and grasp. However, for us 
to be able to say anything about it, to engage in any 
kind of philosophizing, we are at the same time bring-
ing forth this world in a necessarily cut-up, solidified 
and inadequate way, for which we furnish ourselves 
with concepts such as adequacy and truth in order 
to assess our efforts, as well as efforts of those whose 
modes of thinking are not aligned with our own. 
Many seem oblivious of this fact, engaging instead as 
they do in the construction of ontological edifices that 
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float like palaces in the sky—and then passing them 
off as descriptions of reality on to others.
The linguistic acrobatics we are inevitably engaged 
in here go beyond a mere exercise in representa-
tionalism or metaphor-production. In his reading 
of Bergson’s use of concepts, John Mullarkey points 
out that “if the language of process corresponds to 
process-reality that is because it also proceeds as a pro-
cess-reality, rather than because it is a static image of 
it” (154; emphasis added). In other words, language 
does not so much attempt to (and fail to attempt to) 
capture life but rather enacts it, for us humans, in a 
certain way. The distinction between process and 
entity is therefore a heuristic, a conceptual device 
that helps us grasp the world and respond to it, while 
at the same time moving in it and being moved by it. 
The distinction is therefore both an ontological cut 
and an ethical device. Taking on the role of an injunc-
tion, it calls on us humans to respond to the move-
ment that carries us through the world. Significantly, 
for Tim Ingold humans do not live in the world but 
rather move through it. He uses the term “wayfaring” 
to describe “the embodied experience of this per-
ambulatory movement” (2011: 148). Movement is 
also a way of getting to know the world, according to 
Ingold, where knowledge is not seen as classificatory 
but rather as “storied”, being constantly “under con-
struction” (159). Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest 
that movement itself “is knowing” (160), challenging 
in this way the rigid taxonomies we construct about 
the world and thus foreclose it, make it lifeless, or—to 
cite Bergson—“solid”. 
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How can this more intuitive mode of engag-
ing with the world help us in our ethical project in 
the Anthropocene era? Should we try and intuit the 
Anthropocene and ways of responding to it rather than 
try to theorize it? Counterintuitive as it may sound, 
this is perhaps the only sensible way of approaching 
the issue of the human’s intervention into the geo- 
and bio-sphere since many well-documented ratio-
nal arguments and responses have either completely 
failed or, deep down, have been completely irrational. 
And thus the popular Al Gore documentary about 
global warming, An Inconvenient Truth (2006), origi-
nally devised as a slide presentation, may have raised 
awareness of its viewers but it is more difficult to 
prove it has actually changed behavior, especially on 
any meaningful scale. Any individual efforts to recy-
cle more and switch off unnecessary lights have been 
more than offset by transnational counter-efforts: for 
example, “[i]n 2012 the US energy company Exxon—
the world’s largest oil producer—signed a deal with 
Russia to invest up to $500 billion in oil and gas 
exploration and extraction in the Arctic, in Russia’s 
Kara Sea” (Emmott non-pag.), while around that time 
the UK government issued nearly 200 new licenses 
to drill for gas and oil in the North Sea. Suggestions 
to repair the environmental damage by only filling 
in half of the kettle, using one rather than two sheets 
of toilet paper, or buying an electric car fail precisely 
due to the inability to distinguish between process 
and entity and to think across different scales without 
collapsing them into a (singular) human measure of 
things. Such suggestions position environmental and 
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climate change as a matter of individual moral deci-
sions one is obliged to take, while completely blank-
ing out the scale of phenomena we are facing, phe-
nomena such as the overexploitation of oceans, the 
loss of tropical rainforests and woodlands, the rise in 
atmospheric brown clouds as a result of wood burn-
ing and oil use, and the overconsumption of water 
(including so-called “hidden water”, i.e., water used 
to produce other things) and meat.6 Even the generic 
call for the protection of life is misguided, even if well-
intentioned, because it, somewhat hubristically, turns 
life into an object, one that needs protection and that 
is posited as separated from us humans so that we can 
offer it protection, while equipping us with a God-like 
fantasy that we can indeed control and regulate it. In a 
truly Bergsonian vein, Ingold argues that 
An understanding of the unity of life in 
terms of genealogical relatedness is bought 
at the cost of cutting out every single organ-
ism from the relational matrix in which it 
lives and grows. In this understanding, life 
presents itself to our awareness not as the 
interlaced meshwork, famously invoked by 
Charles Darwin in his image of the “entan-
gled bank” (Darwin 1950: 64, see Chapter 
6, p. 84), but rather as an immense scheme 
of classification—nowadays going by the 
name of “biodiversity”—in which every 
individual is assigned to a specific taxon 
(species, genus) on the basis of covert attri-
butes, comprising the genotype, that it is 
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deemed to possess in advance of their phe-
notypic expression in a real-world environ-
ment (Ingold 2000a: 217). (2011: 163)
A minimal injunction for our ethics of the 
Anthropocene would not therefore call on those of us 
who call ourselves human to protect “life” at all cost 
but rather to recognize that life itself is a system con-
stituted by a dynamic movement of forces, that time 
itself is movement, that we are just wayfarers in the 
world, and that microbes were there before us (see 
Eldredge) and will no doubt survive us. Such ethics 
may seem terribly ineffective but, given the ineffec-
tivity of the more grandiose sounding programs and 
undertakings as described above, perhaps a mod-
est experiment in reimagining life—and in thinking 
and living critically—can actually be seen as a viable 
and vital alternative? This recognition of wayfaring 
as a critical model of engaging otherwise involves 
acknowledging, with Lynn Margulis, that “Neither 
animal nor plant is an eternal category of classifica-
tion” (56), that “Animals and plants are far more simi-
lar to each other than they are to all the other kinds 
of Earth life” (56) and, last but not least, that extinc-
tion as a form of movement is part and parcel of 
the process. 
This recognition does not have to amount to fatal-
ism: it carries a task for us transient human animals 
to start figuring out ways of moving better, of dying 
better, and of becoming extinct better, while not los-
ing sight of the fact that any notion of “goodness” 
with regard to life is always species-specific and hence 
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inevitably antagonistic towards its other articulations 
and enactments across other scales. Minimal ethics 
can therefore be said to refer loosely to a set of actions 
we can undertake once we have intuitively grasped 
this constant movement of life, of which we are part, 
and then turned to our compromised and imperfect 
faculty of reason—which is perhaps primarily a story-
telling faculty—in order to tell better stories about life 
in the universe, and about life (and death) of the uni-
verse. Read on an evolutionary non-anthropocentric 
scale, extinction is an inevitable process of the with-
ering away of any species, a process against which 
human attempts to “adapt better” must look hubris-
tically naive. If the human cannot armor himself 
against extinction, its looming prospect “opens up the 
question of life more generally, and of how we wish 
to live whatever time is left for the human species” 
(Colebrook 2012: non-pag.). Evolution and extinc-
tion therefore open up the question of ethics. 
Notes
6. For more on these issues see Timothy Clark, 
“Derangements of Scale” and Stephen Emmott, 
Ten Billion.
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Chapter 4
Evolution
This chapter provides some further historical and 
intellectual context for the ethical project under-
taken in this book. It is through the story of evolu-
tion—understood as both narrative and fact, as the 
unfolding of history as well as the very possibility of 
history—that the contextualization of minimal ethics 
will take place in what follows. The problem of con-
text is important, partly because contextualization is 
something that any pragmatic approach to ethics must 
embark upon and partly because “there is nothing out-
side context” (Derrida 1988: 136).7 This latter state-
ment does not indicate that our minimal ethics will be 
relativist, as contextualization is simply inevitable. In 
other words, there can be no ethics that would remain 
separate from the context in which it operates, even 
if, or especially if this ethics is to be thought across 
different scales. This act of pragmatic recognition 
requires us to abandon any fantasy of speaking about 
universally applicable truths, values and morals. Such 
things simply do not exist, and indeed cannot exist—
although there are many dispensers of morality who 
try to persuade us otherwise. Paradoxical as it may 
sound, a call to consider things across different scales 
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is an attempt to avoid any kind of universalization 
of ethics, and to acknowledge the limitations of the 
human worldview. In other words, we must recognize 
that the human only ever carves out small sections of 
the universe, a process through which s/he produces 
ideas and entities. Overcoming the presumption 
that “man is the measure of all things”, minimal eth-
ics—which we have termed post-anthropocentric, or 
(after Karen Barad and Rosi Braidotti), posthuman-
ist—will not be “held captive to the distance scale of 
the human” but will rather remain “attentive to the 
practices by which scale is produced” (Barad 136). 
The imperative to engage, materially and conceptu-
ally—although inevitably in a way that is restricted 
by our locatedness in a tiny section of space-time—
with scalar processes and effects across the universe is 
therefore the first condition of minimal ethics. This is 
precisely what I mean when I say that this ethics needs 
to be thought on a universal scale, even if it itself will 
remain decidedly non-universalist. 
One major issue that the question of scale requires 
us to rethink in our interrogation of human ontology 
and human history is the differentiation between biol-
ogy and culture upon which the division between sci-
ences and humanities has been premised. Yet the main 
source of the problem is not so much the conflation of 
the cultural with the biological, as explained by Tim 
Ingold in his article “Beyond Biology and Culture: 
The Meaning of Evolution in a Relational World”, but 
rather the reduction of the biological to the genetic, a 
mode of thinking that still informs modern evolution-
ary theory. Even though the majority of biologists are 
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wary of the charge of genetic reductionism, they still 
hold on to the notion of “a complex interaction of ‘bio-
logical’ and ‘cultural’ factors, operating in a given envi-
ronment” (Ingold 2004: 217). What we are faced with 
here are two sets of ontologically different processes 
and entities, with biological factors seen as genetically 
transmitted and cultural ones supposedly transmit-
ted by imitation or social learning. Biology thus ends 
up being tied to genes after all.8 The work of critical 
biologists such as Susan Oyama, Richard Lewontin 
or Daniel Lehrman has raised some serious questions 
for the stability of the dichotomy between nature 
and nurture, “as though these were separate things—
genes on the one hand, environment on the other—
that then interact to form the organism” (Ingold 2004: 
218). Following Lehrman, Ingold points out that 
any such interactions occur not between genes and 
environment bur rather between organism and envi-
ronment, whereby the organism is “the continually 
changing embodiment of a whole history of previous 
interactions that have shaped its life course”, while the 
environment “exists only in relation to the organisms 
that inhabit it, and embodies a history of interactions 
with them” (218). 
We are introduced here to a much more proces-
sual and relational way of thinking about the world, 
whereby matter stabilizes into “organisms” which 
nevertheless always remain entangled with their “envi-
ronment”. If the process of organismic differentiation 
is continuous, the organism needs to be seen not as 
an entity but as multiple processes of entanglement, a 
temporally unfolding set of relations that keep making 
52 Chapter 4
and unmaking the topological boundaries. This brings 
us to a conceptualization of life as “the creative poten-
tial of a dynamic field of relationships in which spe-
cific beings emerge and take the forms they do, each 
in relation to the others. In that sense, life is not so 
much in organisms as organisms in life” (Ingold 2004: 
219). Arguably, such a mode of thinking was already 
at work in Darwin’s early theory of evolution but, in 
its later incarnations, such as Henry Spencer’s theory 
of “natural selection” as encapsulated by the concept 
of the “survival of the fittest” (later evident in the 
instrumentalism of evolutionary biology), it became 
translated into a linear force with a set of predesigned 
tasks to accomplish. Bergson’s 1907 book Creative 
Evolution was an attempt to counter such a teleological 
and instrumentalist reading of evolution. The ongoing 
engagement with Bergsonian thought in contempo-
rary humanities may be seen to be inspired by a desire 
to recapture that forgotten vitality of life.
As explained in the previous chapter, Bergson’s 
argument in Creative Evolution is premised on the cri-
tique of the human intellect. Rather than seeing it as 
a pinnacle of evolutionary development, he positions 
the intellect as a fossilized product of evolution that is 
structurally incapable “of presenting the true nature of 
life, the full meaning of the evolutionary movement in 
the course of its way”, and thus a regression as much 
as a progression (xx). Bergson justifies his conclusion 
by explaining that the intellect deals only with “sol-
ids”, temporarily stabilized images and concepts of 
the world which we take for the latter’s true states and 
their representations. However, on taking cognizance 
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of them, we are simultaneously overlooking the wider 
background, or we could say context: that of dura-
tion and of life’s continuous unfolding. This is why 
Bergson encourages us to turn to intuition, a mode 
of apprehending the world which bridges instinctual 
actions and reactions with our habits of thought in 
order to recapture what the intellect has banned us 
from experiencing. If “matter has a tendency to con-
stitute isolable systems, that can be treated geometri-
cally”, Bergson acknowledges that this is just a ten-
dency, since matter “does not go to the end, and the 
isolation is never complete” (13). Reconnecting the 
intellect back to intuition can help us experience the 
vibrant vitality of matter, its ongoing dynamism and 
productivity. He goes on to argue that “[t]he universe 
endures”, which means that by studying the nature 
of time we shall comprehend that “duration means 
invention, the creation of forms, the continual elabo-
ration of the absolutely new” (14). It is in this sense 
that evolution for Bergson is creative rather than pre-
planned and mechanistic. 
In the light of the preceding argument with 
regard to the ongoing duration of the universe, we 
can see biology and culture as mutually entangled 
processes that differ in degree, but not in kind, to 
use Bergsonian terminology. A similar view has been 
embraced by proponents of the so-called “big his-
tory” model, which situates human history along a 
rather more expansive scale. Simply put, big history is 
a modern science-based creation story that starts with 
the Big Bang and ends with its entropic counterpart: 
the End of the Universe. One of its main proponents, 
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David Christian, explains in his magisterial work, 
Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History, that even 
though there exist some fundamental similarities in 
the nature of all change in the universe, the task of 
the big history project is to explain how the rules of 
change vary at different scales. However, he also goes 
on to claim that: “Human history is different from 
cosmological history; but it is not totally different” 
(7). If evolution occurs across different scales and at 
different speeds—and if, on a human scale, we call it 
“culture” or “history”, while on the scale of the geo-
logical epochs (e.g. the Pleistocene, the Holocene, the 
newly posited Anthropocene) we refer to it as “biol-
ogy”—then the argument about the supposed pur-
posefulness of its unfolding is not really sustainable, 
especially when we consider multiple evolutionary 
blind alleys and false starts.
The latter line of thinking has been developed most 
powerfully by the Polish author Stanisław Lem, who 
is best known to English readers as a science fiction 
writer but who also penned a number of philosophi-
cal commentaries on science, technology and evolu-
tion—the most accomplished of which is his 1964 
treatise on futurology, technology, and science called 
Summa Technologiae. Serving as a perhaps unwitting 
counterpoint to the idealism that underpins Bergson’s 
Creative Evolution with its notion of vital impetus 
(élan vital), Lem’s Summa offers a much more sober, 
even ironic view of evolution, one that is rooted in the 
scientific method and in skepticism.9 Lem’s investiga-
tion into the parallel processes involved in biological 
and technical evolution, and his exploration of the 
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consequences of such parallelism, provide an impor-
tant philosophical and empirical foundation for con-
cepts that many humanities scholars use somewhat 
loosely today, such as “life”, “entanglement” and “rela-
tionality”, while also stripping these concepts of any 
vitalist hubris. For Lem, evolution “just happened”, 
we might say. This way of thinking is no doubt a blow 
to anthropocentrism, which positions the human, and 
human consciousness, as the pinnacle of all creation. 
For Lem not only did evolution not have any “plan” 
or “overarching idea” behind its actions, it also seems 
to have moved in a series of jumps which were full of 
mistakes, false starts, repetitions, and blind alleys. He 
argues that any attempt to delineate a straight genea-
logical line of man would be completely futile, given 
that attempts to descend to earth and walk on two feet 
had been made by living beings over and over again 
in the course of the evolutionary process. As Polish 
critic and author of many publications on Lem, Jerzy 
Jarzębski, points out, Lem also draws an important 
distinction between biological evolution and the 
evolution of reason, rejecting the assumption that an 
increase in the latter automatically means improved 
design capacity. Predating Richard Dawkins’ idea of 
evolution as a blind watchmaker by over two decades, 
Lem’s view of evolution is not just non-romantic; it is 
also rather ironic—as manifested in the closing chap-
ter of Summa, “A Lampoon of Evolution”. Evolution 
is described there as opportunistic, short-sighted, 
miserly, extravagant, chaotic, and illogical in its design 
solutions. Lem writes:
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We know very little about the way in which 
Evolution makes its “great discoveries”, its 
revolutions. They do happen: they consist 
in creating new phyla. It goes without say-
ing that also here evolution proceeds grad-
ually—there is no other way. This is why 
we can accuse it of complete randomness. 
Phyla do not develop as a result of adapta-
tions or carefully arranged changes but are 
a consequence of lots drawn in the evolu-
tionary lottery—except very often, there is 
no top prize. (341)
The product of evolution that is of most interest to 
us—i.e., the human—is seen by Lem as the last relic 
of nature, which is itself in the process of being trans-
formed beyond recognition by the invasion of tech-
nology the human has introduced into his body and 
environment. There is no mourning of this impending 
change on Lem’s part though, no attempt to defend 
nature’s ways and preserve the essential organic unity 
of the human, since the latter is seen to be both tran-
sient and to some extent fictitious. 
And yet, even though none of the entities in the 
universe are indeed pre-planned or necessary, and 
even though the human functions as a fictitious point 
of unity in the non-purposeful unfolding of evolution, 
one that in time will no doubt will be overcome by 
other forms of matter’s stabilization, the human’s tem-
porary presence in the duration of things poses him/
her with a unique responsibility. It is the nature of 
this unique human responsibility within evolutionary 
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history that I am particularly interested in exploring 
in this book. Without rejecting this durational evo-
lutionary framework of varying speeds, I therefore 
want to signal that we should perhaps remain cau-
tious about presenting too neat an analogy between 
different temporalities and scales. However, rather 
than engage in ontological to-ing and fro-ing by try-
ing to either defend an analogy or even contiguity, or 
postulate an inassimilable difference, between the two 
types of evolution, and, more broadly, between biol-
ogy and culture, I want to suggest, yet again, that we 
turn instead to ethical questions that the debate opens 
before us. Indeed, the problem with the big history 
approach is not that it takes us beyond the realm of 
the human to look at larger scales but rather that that it 
naturalizes (in a straightforwardly humanist manner) 
the concept of complexity across cities and cells, with 
the technological events of human history perceived 
as planetary events without any deeper socio-political 
context or significance. Matter does not end up mat-
tering here very much: its only orientation being its 
inscribed decay, which we as humans must do every-
thing to prevent. Systemic equilibrium, understood 
in thermodynamic terms as energy conservation, 
is therefore the goal of the big historical project. “If 
Big Historians have a philosophy of media and tech-
nology, it is an entropic one. They share with politi-
cians and industrialists the belief that what damns us 
may also save us and so negentropy comes to be fig-
ured as sustainability. In the wake of thermodynam-
ics, sustainability has its own three laws: population 
control, climate change control and environmental 
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equilibrium” (Kember and Zylinska XX). Postulating 
an “underlying unity” (Christian xxiv) of things, big 
history shores up the Anthropocene as a cross-scalar 
scarecrow figure, one that banishes the study of lit-
erature, art, sociology, politics, philosophy and eco-
nomics to the dustbin of human history. The problem 
with big history is therefore first of all politico-ethical 
rather than ontological in that it puts forward a set of 
implicit technicist “fixes” to the Anthropocene, with-
out reflecting on its own embeddedness in the net-
work of human(ist) self-possession and self-interest. 
Taking seriously Rosi Braidotti’s injunction to exer-
cise “civic responsibility for the role of the academic 
today” (2013: 10), the chapters that follow will make 
more use of these old style “humanities” disciplines to 
come up with a better mode of thinking these political 
and ethical questions, thus hopefully contributing in a 
small way towards the development of a post-humani-
ties framework.10 
      
Notes
7. “There is nothing outside context” is another possible 
translation offered by Derrida to his famous statement, il 
n'y a pas de hors-texte (there is nothing outside the text), 
which some have mistakenly reduced to just saying that 
language is all there is.
8. Ingold argues that this “implied essentialisation of 
biology as a constant of human being, and of culture 
as its variable and interactive complement, is not just 
clumsily imprecise. It is the single major stumbling 
block that up to now has prevented us from moving 
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towards an understanding of our human selves, and of 
our place in the living world, that does not endlessly 
recycle the polarities, paradoxes and prejudices of 
western thought” (2004: 217).
9. The material on Lem included in this and the next 
chapter has been partly reworked from the introduction 
I wrote to my translation of Summa, “Evolution May Be 
Greater Than the Sum of Its Parts, But It’s Not All That 
Great: On Lem’s Summa Technnologiae”, which came out 
with the University of Minnesota Press in 2013.
10. In her book The Posthuman Braidotti recognises the 
importance of defending the legacy of the humanities 
as an academic discipline, especially in the light of 
the critique this discipline is currently receiving in 
the neoliberal political regime. Her agenda for “post-
human Humanities”, premised on a radical reinvestment 
in critical thought and a creative engagement with 
technology, is outlined in the following terms: “The 
image of thought implied in the post-anthropocentric 
definition of the Human goes much further in the 
deconstruction of the subject, because it stresses radical 
relationality, that is to say non-unitary identities and 
multiple allegiances. As this shift occurs in a globalized 
and conflict-ridden world, it opens up new challenges 
in terms of both post-secular and post-nationalist 
perspectives […] Against the prophets of doom, I 
want to argue that technologically mediated post-
anthropocentrism can enlist the resources of bio-genetic 
codes, as well as telecommunication, new media and 
information technologies, to the task of renewing 
the Humanities. Posthuman subjectivity reshapes 
the identity of humanistic practices, by stressing 
heteronomy and multi-faceted relationality, instead 
of autonomy and self-referential disciplinary purity” 
(2013: 144-45).
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Chapter 5
Humanity 
This chapter provides some further historical and 
intellectual context for the concept of the human. 
This concept has not enjoyed a particularly good 
reception in recent critical theory: “the human” has 
been exposed by postructuralism and posthuman-
ism as nothing more than a fantasy of unity and self-
hood that excludes the human’s dependency on other 
beings and non-living entities; it has been seen as too 
Eurocentric and masculinist by postcolonial and femi-
nist theory; and has been revealed by various sciences 
to be just an arbitrary cut off point in the line of spe-
cies continuity on the basis of characteristics shared 
across the species barrier: communication, emotions 
or tool use. Taking on board the critique coming from 
all these different quarters and its political and ethi-
cal force, I want to consider here the extent to which 
it is desirable or even possible to return the human 
after the posthumanist critique.11 The reasons for this 
proposed return have nothing to do with any kind of 
residual humanism or species nostalgia. Instead, they 
spring from the recognition of the strategic role of the 
concept of the human in any kind of ethical project 
worth its salt, especially given that many of so-called 
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posthumanist positions bring in humanism and other 
forms of essentialism through the back door of their 
theories anyway, under the guise of concepts such as 
love, kindness, relationality and co-emergence (see 
Zylinska 2012).
This (non- or post-humanist) human—one that 
could be written in quotation marks, placed under 
erasure, or, as I have done here, preceded by a quali-
fying adjective—entails the realization on the part 
of many theorists who still keep using this term that 
we are in (philosophical) trouble as soon as we start 
speaking about the human, but it also shows a certain 
intransigence that makes (some of) us hang on to the 
vestiges of the concept that has structured our think-
ing and philosophy for many centuries. There is no 
doubt something narcissistic about this enquiry into 
the instability of the human, inevitably conducted by 
a human subject, as is perhaps about the very practice 
of philosophy. But if narcissism is our way of relating, 
no matter if in a hospitable or violent way, to what we 
see as being different from us, then we should work 
towards what Derrida has called a “welcoming, hos-
pitable narcissism, one that is much more open to 
the experience of the other as other” (1995: 199)—
even if this other is already part of “us”. The “we” of 
this sentence refers precisely to this critiqued, erased 
and qualified “human”, but the latter needs to be seen 
as an ethical injunction directed at those of us who 
can get involved in the practices of thinking what it 
means to live a good life, in a professional or amateur 
capacity, rather than as any stable ontological designa-
tion. Instead, the human is positioned here a strategic 
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designation that allows for the formulation and under-
standing of injunctions and ethical tasks of all kinds, 
one that remains aware of the history of philosophy 
and of its critique. 
The plurality of this “human we” in the ethical 
context is not without problems: Emmanuel Levinas 
claims that ethical obligation only ever applies to me. 
For Levinas, “I am put in the passivity of an unde-
clinable assignation, in the accusative, a self. Not as a 
particular case of the universal, an ego belonging to 
the concept of ego, but as I, said in the first person—
I, unique in my genus” (1998: 139). It is my anxiety 
about death and my awareness of my own mortal-
ity that place me on a linear and finite temporal scale 
while also creating a set of possibilities to be real-
ized within that scale. These possibilities include the 
ultimate possibility of things coming to an end: they 
entail the end of me as a specimen of “humans” and 
the end of the human as a species. We may therefore 
go so far as to suggest that Levinas’ ethics, which we 
will discuss in more detail later on, can be seen as a par 
excellence ethical framework for the Anthropocene 
because it makes me face up to the question of extinc-
tion across different scales. The humanism of Levinas’ 
own ethics aside,12 the perhaps unabashedly narcis-
sistic singularity of the “I” of that framework itself 
poses us with a problem. This problem was poignantly 
captured by Timothy Morton, whose book of eco-
criticism, Ecology without Nature, has been inspired 
to some extent by Levinas’ notion of responsibility. 
Offering an account of his own writerly efforts to tell 
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a philosophical story of what counts as “Nature” and 
how we humans perceive it differently, Morton writes: 
The more I try to evoke where I am—the 
“I” who is writing this text—the more 
phrases and figures of speech I must 
employ. I must get involved in a process 
of writing, the very writing that I am not 
describing when I evoke the environ-
ment in which writing is taking place. The 
more convincingly I render my surround-
ings, the more figurative language I end 
up with. The more I try to show you what 
lies beyond this page, the more of a page I 
have. And the more of a fictional “I” I have-
splitting “me” into the one who is writing 
and the one who is being written about—
the less convincing I sound. (2007: 30)
This kind of vacillation can perhaps be dismissed by 
enemies of critical theory as philosophical navel-gaz-
ing, yet the suspension of human mastery—the mas-
tery claimed both over himself and the universe—it 
entails does provide a more viable grounding for an 
ethical position that deems itself “minimal”. It also 
serves as a caution against any attempts to issue strong 
ethical injunctions from this position, attempts that 
seemingly forget about our human locatedness in evo-
lution’s “deep” history.
A more processual understanding of evolution—a 
term Bergson uses interchangeably with notions such 
as movement and life—will help us intuit that there is 
no finality to evolutionary movement and, therefore, 
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that “the line of evolution that ends in man is not the 
only one” (Bergson xxii). Chemist Peter Butko points 
out that we humans “are not the crowning achieve-
ment of evolution, and it would indeed be strange if 
evolution stopped now” (102). However, even though 
we humans are just a temporary stabilization in the 
non-purposeful unfolding of the evolutionary process, 
our emergence in and with life arguably does pose us 
with a unique responsibility. This responsibility is 
partly historical, i.e., it is connected with our evolved 
ability to put our intuition and intellect to certain uses 
in order to reflect on what makes life good, and how to 
make life better—for ourselves and for others—while 
recognizing that there may exist an inherent antago-
nism between different entities and species in judging, 
or simply experiencing, such “goodness”. Those others 
do not of course have to be human or even completely 
external to us: the universe itself is our most pressing 
“other”. This is not to deny the fact that the key signal 
points of the human such as language, culture, tool use 
and emotions have actually been found across the spe-
cies barrier.13 Yet the historicity of this reflection on 
the human use of those products of evolution entails 
acknowledging that the Homo sapiens is also a Homo 
faber moraliae, that is that the human has developed a 
long tradition of reflecting on the emergence of cus-
toms, morals and values across culture—a practice to 
which s/he has given the name “ethics”, and in which 
s/he has frequently resorted to storytelling. In other 
words, even if the difference between the human and 
other living entities is more of degree than of kind, to 
return to the Bergsonian terminology we have made 
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use of before, ethics and storytelling are two sets of 
intertwined practices in which human singularity—
which is not to be confused with human supremacy—
has manifested itself in the Anthropocene (as well as 
the Holocene). They are also arguably tools through 
which the Anthropocene can be both apprehended 
and amended. The Anthropocene, as explained in the 
first chapter, names a new geological epoch that marks 
significant and irreversible human influence upon 
the geo- and biosphere via processes such as farming, 
deforestation, mining and urbanization. The term has 
been seen as controversial by many geologists; how-
ever, in this book it is used less as a scientific descrip-
tor and more as an ethical pointer, outlining our 
human obligation towards the universe—of which we 
are only a tiny part.
An acknowledgement of the universal, “big-his-
torical” scale across which things happen—some-
thing that does not come to us humans so easily and 
that is most often presented through a series of analo-
gies—is a useful conceptual device for introducing 
humility into any ethical project that wants to make 
life in that tiny local irregularity of the universe called 
earth better. The minimalism of ethics thus proposed 
emerges as a result of the pragmatic recognition of 
the limitations of human faculties (reason and imagi-
nation, intellect and intuition). But it also becomes a 
meaningful injunction to pay attention to what “we 
humans”—who are temporary stabilizations of mat-
ter in that local irregularity of the universe called 
earth—are actually capable of grasping, from the 
midst of things, as it were. It is therefore an attempt to 
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give an account of, and simultaneously counter, what 
astrophysicists call “the strong anthropic principle”, 
a tendency to explain the universe from our human 
standpoint, as if it existed uniquely for us humans. As 
Hawking clarifies,
We have developed from the geocentric 
cosmologies of Ptolemy and his forebears, 
through the heliocentric cosmology of 
Copernicus and Galileo, to the modern 
picture in which the earth is a medium-
sized planet orbiting around an average 
star in the outer suburbs of an ordinary spi-
ral galaxy, which is itself only one of about 
a million million galaxies in the observable 
universe. Yet the strong anthropic principle 
would claim that this whole vast construc-
tion simply exists for our sake. This is very 
hard to believe. Our Solar System is cer-
tainly a prerequisite for our existence, and 
one might extend this to the whole of our 
galaxy to allow for an earlier generation of 
stars that created the heavier elements. But 
there does not seen to be any need for all 
those other galaxies, nor for the universe 
to be so uniform in every direction on the 
large scale. (126)
The recognition of this non-necessity of the uni-
verse, and of the emergence of life—including con-
scious life—in it, does not diminish our responsibil-
ity for this medium-sized planet we call home and 
its surroundings, or for its human and nonhuman 
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inhabitants. However, it does potentially strip any 
mode of philosophizing about it off a certain explana-
tory and interventionist hubris. This kind of posthu-
manist, or better, non-anthropocentric standpoint 
poses a challenge to human exceptionalism, but it 
also remains accountable, to cite Barad, “for the role 
we play in the differential constitution and differen-
tial positioning of the human among other creatures 
(both living and nonliving)” (136). So even though it 
is not all about us, we humans have a singular respon-
sibility to give an account of the differentiations of 
matter, of which we are part. Ethics is therefore con-
stitutively linked with poetics, because it comes to 
us through stories, i.e. through narratives of different 
genres and kinds. It is through the latter that we make 
sense of the world and pass on instructions on how 
to live to younger generations. We need such instruc-
tions because we come into the world unformed, lack-
ing the basic capacities to move within it, communi-
cate with others and transform our surroundings. In 
other words, we lack sophia, widely conceived wis-
dom, which stands for both intelligence and affective-
motoric know-how, and without which we are equally 
inclined to create and destroy ourselves and others, 
to make love and war (see Stiegler). It is only though 
relationality with what is not in us—with other living 
beings but also with the widely conceived “environ-
ment” that consists of animate and inanimate enti-
ties and processes—that we can activate the life that 
moves us, and it is only through instruction in wis-
dom that we can learn to apprehend our own situated-
ness in the network of ever changing relations. 
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From our own narrow and earth-bound human 
point of view, there is something rather tragic about 
the universe and the way it unfolds in such a seem-
ingly futile manner. Our attempts to construct civili-
zations, philosophies and religions are ways of over-
coming this futility, even if the very notion of futility 
is itself a product of those civilizations, philosophies 
and religions. Anthropocentrism becomes our shield 
in this struggle, one that has served us well through 
centuries but that we may want to put down if we want 
to avoid being like a child who thinks he has become 
invisible only because he has closed his eyes. With 
our eyes closed, we will not be able to see the evolu-
tionary unfolding which is likely to sweep us away at 
some point (although there may be reasons why we 
may prefer to miss out on this particular event). This 
anthropocentric shield will also hide from us the 
unfolding of the technoevolutionary process which 
we ourselves put in motion and which is still revers-
ible, at least theoretically. Yet Stanisław Lem, whose 
aforementioned 1964 book Summa Technologiae is 
one of the most powerful accounts of evolution and 
the human’s place in it, has serious doubts about the 
likelihood of any such reversal on our part. Moving 
beyond the anthropocentric framework in which the 
human is seen as occupying the very top of the chain 
of beings, Lem nevertheless spends a good deal of 
time considering humans’ singularity in the cosmic 
universe, as well as their moral and political respon-
sibility. The Polish author remains skeptical with 
regard to the rationality of human beings. As Lem 
puts it rather ominously, “Man knows more about his 
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dangerous tendencies than he did a hundred years 
ago, and in the next hundred years his knowledge will 
be even more advanced. Then he will make use of it” 
(2013: 6). It becomes quite clear that Lem is not very 
optimistic about the human as the product of evolu-
tion—not just in terms of our future developmental 
prospects, as mentioned above, but also in terms of 
our current ethico-political situation. This is perhaps 
unsurprising since, as explained in the previous chap-
ter, evolution cannot be trusted with knowing what 
it is doing. Neither, seemingly, can we—at least not 
always or consistently—because we lack wisdom that 
would prevent us from entering into unnecessary con-
flict. This limitation results from an underlying con-
flict “between a conscious mind that can think and 
an underlying program that determines action”, i.e., 
genes, as explained by N. Katherine Hayles (29). 
What is the human to do in the light of this con-
flict? According to Lem, “the traditionally inherited 
types of ethics are all rapidly becoming impotent” 
(Swirski 115). Living through the collapse of vari-
ous forms of authority, secularization, the emer-
gence of both extreme nationalisms and extreme 
regionalisms, as well as the pathologies of escapism, 
the modern human faces a kind of horror vacui, “giv-
ing us as a result a new type of ‘man without con-
science’” (Swirski 114). Such pessimism and sorrow 
about the human condition is obviously a familiar 
trope in both philosophy and literature. Yet we have 
to distinguish here between the pessimistic view of 
the human as encapsulated by many metaphysical 
narratives, including those of the dominant religions, 
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whereby man is suffering from some kind of original 
sin or some other innate fault that predisposes him to 
doing evil, and the more skeptical-realist argument, 
which evaluates human faults empirically, so to speak, 
on the basis of historical experience. Furthermore, 
this positing of the potential to do evil is an argument 
through subtraction: the human will eventually make 
use of the acquired knowledge and put it to various 
uses, including harmful ones, because there is noth-
ing inherent either in the human or the world to stop 
this course of action. (Pseudo-scientific theories of 
evolutionary ethics, whereby our moral intuitions 
are seen as evolved forms of behavior that protect us 
against our genes and the supposed “truth” they carry, 
fall apart both against circumstantial evidence and 
rigorous philosophical enquiry into their founding 
assumptions.) 
Political systems, state and organizational policies, 
moral codes, and cultural values may serve as barriers 
against such negative and damaging turns of events. 
However, in most cases politics and ethics find it dif-
ficult to catch up with the development of science. As 
a consequence they arrive too late to prevent various 
events from happening. This restricted freedom with 
regard to his/her own agency, combined with the lack 
of knowledge about being with others in the world, 
contribute to the human’s self-diagnosed tragic con-
dition discussed earlier. Lem is less inclined to offer 
solutions to this state of events, even if he does rec-
ognize the role of ethics as a structural device used to 
contain human aggression and violence. Betrization, a 
procedure from his novel Return from the Stars which 
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is executed upon all human fetuses in order to tame 
their violent impulses, is raised as an ironic proposi-
tion, with the belief that any solution to the human 
“evil” would have to be technicist. (Incidentally, a 
similar argument returns, less ironically, in Emmott’s 
book, Ten Billion—and is actually already applied by 
the pharmaceutical industry in the so-called devel-
oped world through the widespread propagation of 
antidepressants and ADHD medication.)
Drawing on this line of thought that sees ethics as 
a uniquely human intervention into the world which 
is quintessentially nonhuman, the minimal ethics out-
lined throughout this book tries to move beyond the 
lethargy of irony and the instrumentalism of technical 
fixes. Minimal ethics is therefore less a solution and 
more a proposition—a proposition to put up the ques-
tion of ethics on the current agenda, alongside other, 
seemingly more pressing and global issues such sus-
tainability, climate change, fossil fuel crisis, human 
survival, etc. Unless we are prepared to do this, and to 
position ethics itself as a particularly pressing issue for 
the Anthropocene, we run the danger of falling prey 
either to anthropocentric moralism (where values are 
being laid out without questioning the process of their 
fabrication and the conflict in which they always exist 
with some other values) or to delegating authority to 
technology which remains underpinned by instru-
mentalist assumptions. It goes without saying that 
any form of ethics thus posited needs to remain tech-
nically aware—i.e., it needs to take responsibility for 
our technical genealogy and technical future, to man-
age technology while seeing ourselves and the world 
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in and with which we emerge as inherently techni-
cal—instead of being positioned as a human weapon 
against technology. Indeed, ethics itself is always a 
form of technics, a reaching out beyond the con-
fines of the human(ist) moral self to other forms of 
becoming in the universe, many of which the human 
is coevolving with. However, even though the ethical 
human subject is to be seen as relational, and hence 
technological and prosthetic, this does not mean that 
any interventions to his biogenetic make-up, or to the 
make-up of his environment, will have to be seen as 
morally equal. The minimal ethical task that emerges 
here consists in knowing how to differentiate between 
different forms of relationality, or, in other words, how 
to manage technics well, as much as we can, in the lit-
tle time that we have left. 
One final issue that needs addressing here is that 
of the ontological and ethical status of “animals” in 
this framework—a term I have so far eschewed using 
in this book. Even though I recognize the important 
political work undertaken both by animal studies 
scholars and animal activists in drawing attention to 
animal suffering or even managing to reduce it, I am 
also aware of the limitations of this all-encompassing 
concept, embracing both pets and pests; companion 
species with a recognizable “face” as well as spiders, 
seahorses, sloths and shrews. The problem is not 
fully resolved by incorporating the human into the 
wider specter of animality because the actual gesture 
of obviating “the human-animal distinction” can only 
ever be made from the point of species difference (see 
Zylinska 2012)—although such an argument can be 
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useful in challenging human superiority and special 
positioning across evolutionary unfoldings. Yet in any 
such attempts the human desire to philosophize about 
the animal (or even about himself as animal) remains 
surprisingly free from critical enquiry: many scholars 
seem oblivious of the fact that any suspension or aban-
donment of the human-animal distinction, just like 
any form of thinking about the animal as the human’s 
supposed “other”, can only be undertaken from within 
the anthropocentric position of cognitive superiority, 
with all the hegemonic authority it entails and con-
firms. The strategic use of the term “human” in this 
book is therefore not coupled with an equally stra-
tegic embracing of its “animal” equivalent, precisely 
because the latter is not its equivalent. The typological 
gap we are introducing here should be seen as first and 
foremost an ethical orientation rather than as an abso-
lute epistemological or ontological differentiation. 
Morton’s term “strange strangers” (2010: 41) can help 
us in designating this orientation, without reintro-
ducing any radical differences between species or life 
forms, because all these “strange strangers” are mutu-
ally enmeshed. However, ethics is not a mutuality: as 
explained before, the responsibility that arises here 
is not so much just even human but only ever mine. 
The “I” here does not stand for a Kantian individual 
self-present moral subject, but rather for an entangled 
and dynamically constituted node in the network of 
relations to whom an address is being made and upon 
whom an obligation is being placed, and who is thus 
made-temporarily-singular precisely via this address.
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Notes
11. This chapter develops further some of the ideas raised in 
my article, “Bioethics Otherwise, or, How to Live with 
Machines, Humans, and Other Animals”.
12. I discuss the humanist limitations of Levinas’ ethics 
in my Bioethics in the Age of New Media, while also 
providing a justification for salvaging the notion of 
ethical responsibility from Levinas’ work for a non-
anthropocentric ethical theory. I return to this latter 
point in various sections of this book. 
13. For a discussion of how the behaviors that used to be 
seen as uniquely human have now been found across 
the species barrier, see Zylinska, “Bioethics Otherwise, 
or, How to Live with Machines, Humans, and 
Other Animals”. 
Fig. 7: Joanna Zylinska, Topia daedala 7, 2014
Chapter 6
Ontology
“The world” does not really name any kind of objec-
tive external reality. Rather, as I suggested in chapter 
two, this term should be understood as first and fore-
most referring to a temporary mental organization, 
undertaken by a spatially embedded and embodied 
human, of the various processes of which she is part. 
To say this is by no means to deny the existence of 
things beyond our representation or imagining of it; it 
is just to acknowledge the limitations of our cognition 
and language in grasping things as they (supposedly) 
are. Imposing unity on them through the concept of 
“the world” (or, equally, separating them with our 
intellect into those very “things”) is therefore nothing 
more than a mental operation, an operation which is 
conditioned by our adopted theoretical and linguistic 
frameworks. This kind of mental operation becomes 
a way of domesticating the enormity and complexity 
of our universe, as is made evident in Neil Shubin’s 
popular science book, The Universe Within. Citing 
the American philosopher William James, Shubin 
says that religious experience is said to emanate pre-
cisely “from ‘feeling at home in the universe’”, which is 
similar to how Kant explained the mechanism of the 
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sublime, with our mind ultimately triumphant over 
the failure of our imagination to grasp extreme scales 
or complex dynamics precisely because it can theorize 
this failure, and thus obtain consolation. For scientist 
Shubin consolation comes from our acknowledge-
ment of the unity of cosmic matter across different 
scales in the universe, even if we cannot see or fully 
grasp those scales. He writes: “With bodies composed 
of particles derived from the birth of stellar bodies and 
containing organs shaped by the workings of planets, 
eroding rock, and the action of the seas, it is hard not 
to see home everywhere” (185). 
Consolation and cosmic domesticity are desired 
by us humans precisely because the majority of pro-
cesses in the so-called “world” (or, indeed, “universe”) 
across its different scales unfold outside and beneath 
both human agency and human consciousness, in 
ways that we can at best describe with mathemati-
cal equations but that we cannot ever obtain a “total” 
picture of. Some think it is just a matter of develop-
ing better physics or better telescopes. However, I am 
in agreement with the proponents of flat ontology 
such as Bruno Latour, Graham Harman and Levi R. 
Bryant, who claim that “the world does not exist”—
even if myself I retain the need to use the term strategi-
cally. Yet, even while doing this, I follow Bryant in 
asserting that “there is no ‘super-object’, Whole, or 
totality that would gather all objects together in a har-
monious unity” (32). This, I should signal, is perhaps 
my only substantial point of agreement with object-
oriented philosophy, a recently popular framework of 
thought which debunks traditional (“correlationist”) 
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philosophy as humanist while at the same time occlud-
ing its own foundational, and not any less humanist, 
gesture. Indeed, object-oriented philosophy’s onto-
logical ambitions are premised on the very correla-
tionist principles its authors critique in proponents of 
other modes of philosophizing about “the world”. 
It is this unexamined desire to construct ontolo-
gies, be it flat or layered ones, that is most troubling 
for me in the work of many contemporary thinkers 
today—including a number of process philosophers, 
who seem not to attend to the processuality of the 
process all that carefully. Indeed, for many, “process” 
becomes just a tool in the building of worlds, even 
if the actual worlds produced are deemed unstable, 
open, fluid. More often than not, such worlds are 
just gifts that the (usually male) philosopher charms 
out of his hat and passes on to his followers. To put 
it bluntly—although I aim to defend this statement 
later on—this intellectual trend towards ontology-
building is not just masculinist but also, in a bizarrely 
achronological way, pre-feminist. Many of the think-
ers I am hinting at here—not just the object-oriented 
ontology “school” but also political philosophers of 
the more continental bent such as Alain Badiou or 
Slavoj Žižek—defend the ontological modes of the 
thinking they promote through the supposed urgency 
of the current political conjuncture, offering various 
forms of critique of the emasculation of philosophy 
by sophistry and calling for a return to philosophy 
“proper” (see Braidotti 2013: 5).14 Badiou deserves 
a special mention here as a self-fashioned lone voice 
in a philosophical desert, a defender of ontology and 
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the truth process amidst the cacophony of deception 
and rhetorical half-truths. This is why I want to spend 
some time looking at the ontological desire espoused 
yet also partly occluded in his work—especially as I 
aim to position minimal ethics as a viable way to con-
tinue philosophizing in a counter-ontological, post-
masculinist way. 
Significantly, it is common-or-garden ethics that 
evokes Badiou’s particular ire. In the Introduction to 
Ethics, a little book originally intended for sixth-form-
ers, he writes:
Certain scholarly words, after long con-
finement in dictionaries and in academic 
prose, have the good fortune, or the mis-
fortune—a little like an old maid who, 
long since resigned to her fate, suddenly 
becomes, without understanding why, the 
toast of the town—of sudden exposure to 
the bright of day, of being plebi- and publi-
cited, press-released, televised, even men-
tioned in government speeches. The word 
ethics, which smacks so strongly of phi-
losophy courses and its Greek root, which 
evokes Aristotle (The Nicomachean Ethics, 
one of the great bestsellers!), has today 
taken centre stage. (2001: 1)
The traditional kind of ethics that Badiou critiques, 
and that his own book Ethics is written against, is 
compared here to a woman—“an old maid”, not 
very attractive and yet clearly gagging for it, without 
much hope that it’s actually going to happen—who 
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suddenly becomes the toast of the town. Everyone 
suddenly wants to have a bit of her, to have a share 
of her old maidenhood. Traditional ethics, the ethics 
of evil, of victimhood and of morals, might be a little 
“minging”, it’s a potential little slapper resigned to her 
solitude only to find herself suddenly on the stage, 
pole-dancing before the audience of randy, red-faced 
punters. Against this somewhat distasteful image of 
ethics as an old maid freely dispensing her not-so-
attractive gifts, an ethics which “smacks so strongly 
of philosophy courses” but which in fact only mas-
querades as true philosophy, Badiou sets his ethics of 
truths: rigid, focused and solemn. It is an ethics that 
Peter Hallward calls “decisive” and Simon Critchley 
describes as “heroic”. The gaping hole of the slapper 
can be opposed here with the composure of an ascetic 
whose motto is “Keep going” (aka the Badiouan-
Lacanian “Continuez”). 
Badiou’s critique applies in particular to the ethics 
of sympathy for the other, a mode of thinking which 
only in fact keeps the other in his or her place, and 
which, under the guise of the celebration of differ-
ence, confines this other to the oppressive category 
of the “victim” while simultaneously constructing a 
hierarchy of bigger and lesser forms of oppression. His 
book Ethics is an attack on “a generalised victimiza-
tion” inherent in the ideology of human rights and a 
defense of the antihumanism of the 1960s. According 
to Badiou, Western hegemonic politics (what he calls 
“democratic totalitarianism”, 2001: lv) legitimizes its 
actions (e.g. intervention in Serbia, in Afghanistan) 
through moralizing sermons. Even though I am 
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advocating ethics as a “better” mode of philoso-
phizing than ontology, I do share Badiou’s concerns 
regarding replacing politics with the “mindless cat-
echism” (2001: liii) or “moral terrorism” of contem-
porary culturalist ethical discourses, which in fact 
serve Western capitalism and its many institutions, 
where “goodness” itself becomes a good to be traded 
in. The multiplicity of “the world” becomes reduced 
to the knowable sequence of important human (and 
increasingly nonhuman) others, such as “animals”, 
with their particularist struggles being prioritized in 
terms of bigger and lesser oppression. As a result of 
this way of thinking, politics becomes subordinated to 
ethics, to the single perspective that really matters in 
this conception of things: the sympathetic and indig-
nant judgment of the spectator of the circumstances 
(2001: 9). This type of ethics, according to Badiou, 
results in “the unrestrained pursuit of self-interest, the 
disappearance or extreme fragility of emancipatory 
politics, the multiplication of ‘ethnic’ conflict, and 
the universality of unbridled competition” (10). The 
human being is defined here as a victim, as “the being 
who is capable of recognizing himself as a victim” 
(10). This notion of ethics, argues Badiou, “prohib-
its every broad, positive vision of possibilities” (14); 
ethics becomes only a “conservation by the so-called 
‘West’ of what it possesses” (14).
However, it should perhaps be clarified here that 
this girly, weepy thing that Badiou condemns as ethics 
is really an old-fashioned moralism, which, in Wendy 
Brown’s words, stands for “a reproachful moralizing 
sensibility”, “or a kind of posture or pose taken up in 
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the ruins of morality by its faithful adherents” (2001: 
22-23). Although morality as well as moralism arise 
out of the subject’s unacknowledged attachment to 
a given idea of truth, and to identity positioned in 
terms of injury, moralism is particularly harmful, as 
it replaces the passion of a quasi-religious conviction 
which is nevertheless capable of inspiring an eman-
cipatory movement with paranoia, mania and, ulti-
mately, political stasis (see Zylinska 2009: 153). In 
the light of this dismissal of ethics, Badiou wheels out 
his ontological weapons: singular truths are the only 
thing that can provide a grounding for a viable ethi-
cal framework for him, a proposition that is markedly 
different from the various forms of the ethics of alter-
ity (Levinas, Irigaray), antagonism (Mouffe, Butler) 
or relationality (Braidotti) that have been prevalent in 
cultural theory over the recent decades.
Indeed, Badiou insists that his “ethics of truths” 
must remain a-relational and hence a-social because it 
compels distance from commonplace opinion, intro-
ducing a clash between post-evental fidelity and “the 
normal pace of things” (2001: 54). A rhythmic vacil-
lation is clearly implied here: it springs from the dis-
turbance of the regular order by the irruption of the 
extraordinary. This is the moment in which we are 
endowed with a task of having to remain faithful to 
this event (or, rather, to our naming of it), i.e. having 
to live the consequences of its nomination. Badiou 
writes, “An evental fidelity is a real break […] in the 
specific order within which the event took place” 
(42). A truth is thus always post-evental; it is a name 
which is extracted from the void (see Badiou 1991). 
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Another way of understanding the event—one of the 
key terms in Badiou’s philosophy—is as an eruption 
of the novelty that obliges one to think the situation, 
or as a provisional suspension of the multiplicity of 
interpretations (which implies a prior recognition 
of this multiplicity). The event is thus a breach of 
the ordinary by the extraordinary, an exposure and 
explosion of our animality by something that has hap-
pened and that makes us “decide a new way of being” 
(Badiou 2001: 41). 
The imagery of seizure and interruption, of punc-
turing and piercing through, is recurrent in Badiou’s 
writings. A truth process enabled by the event 
“punches a hole” in our knowledges of the situa-
tion (43) and prompts us to think again, anew. I am 
“seized by the not-known”, and, “as a result [of the 
event], I am also suspended, broken, annulled; dis-
interested” (49-51). “[T]he piercing-through of an 
encounter” composes a subject (52), while “[e]ach 
faithful truth-process is an entirely immanent break 
with the situation” (44). Yet it is difficult for me to 
pass without comment over this sense of seizure and 
piercing through, of uprightness and rigidity, of vio-
lence and irruption, of Badiou’s philosophy, and the 
language through which it is conveyed. I am aware 
that Badiou himself not only shows little interest in 
linguistic games but is in fact actively committed to 
“freeing philosophy from the tyranny of language”. 
Those who are preoccupied with linguistic interpreta-
tion and language games, supporters of what Badiou, 
after Lyotard, calls “The Great Linguistic Turn” of 
Western Philosophy (1999: 94), are deemed sophists, 
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and thus positioned as anti-philosophers, who are 
nevertheless “useful” in marking the beginning of a 
new philosophical era which Badiou is hoping to inau-
gurate. Badiou writes, “The sophist is from the outset 
the enemy-brother, philosophy’s implacable twin” 
(1999: 116). The trouble is that contemporary soph-
ists frequently masquerade as “great philosophers”, 
playing with their veils and mirrors to create an illu-
sion that “the fundamental opposition is not between 
truth and error or wandering, but between speech 
and silence, between what can be said and what is 
impossible to say” (116-17). Denying the existence 
of truth, the sophist’s claims only support convention, 
rules and language games—where the seriousness of 
truth as the central category of philosophy is required, 
the sophist, “a perverted double of the philosopher” 
(133), is only interested in playing (or, perhaps even, 
in playing with himself). But philosophy’s task is by 
no means to annihilate the sophist—as Badiou puts it, 
“No, the sophist must only be assigned to his place” 
(133). The sophist’s unruliness, his constant stepping 
out of line, his shadowing of the philosophy with his 
illusions and performances, his conniving tricks, have 
to be terminated, if the return of and to philosophy is 
to be accomplished. 
The actual “sophists” referred to in Badiou’s writ-
ings are predominantly male philosophers (Nietzsche, 
Wittgenstein, Derrida, to name but a few). But let us 
ponder for a moment whether it is not the femininity 
of the sophist, i.e., his position as a woman, a figure 
of masquerade, pretense and non-truth, that needs to 
be expelled from philosophy for it to continue in its 
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systemic (rigid, correct and erect) manner. Derrida’s 
Spurs offers a mocking explication of precisely such 
a masquerade in which woman as the “truth of non-
truth” deceives and disguises the truth of philosophy 
with her artful tricks:
Since [woman] is a model for truth she 
is able to display the gifts of her seduc-
tive power, which rules over dogmatism, 
and disorients and routs those credulous 
men, the philosophers. And because she 
does not believe in the truth (still, she 
does find that uninteresting truth in her 
interest) woman remains a model, only 
this time a good model. But because she 
is a good model she is in fact a bad model. 
She plays at dissimulation, at ornamenta-
tion, deceit, artifice, at an artist’s philoso-
phy. (1979: 67)
From the vantage point of “philosophy proper”, the 
minimal ethics outlined throughout this volume 
would be seen as precisely such a masquerade, an 
exercise in sophistry that does not offer any truths, 
engaging instead in the game of smoke and mirrors. 
Admittedly, its twenty one theses outlined in the 
Conclusion perhaps read more like poetry. And yet in 
its withholding of truths and its lack of desire to build 
“worlds” and pass them off as reality, it is premised 
on one strong injunction directed at the human who 
is already involved in the game of philosophizing—
either professionally, as a scholar, writer or theolo-
gian, or, in a broader sense, as someone trying to make 
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sense of how to live a good life: an injunction to keep a 
check on one’s ontologizing ambitions. To recognize the 
human activity of sense-making and the human ori-
entation towards what is not in her already entails an 
ethical challenge: to respond to the difference of what 
we are calling “the world”. 
“Difference” is not of course a problem-free cat-
egory—Badiou points out that “There are as many 
differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a 
young Norwegian professional as between myself 
and anybody at all, including myself ”. (And then he 
adds, “As many, but also, then, neither more nor less” 
(2001: 26).) What Badiou seems to be doing here is 
emptying the philosophy of difference of its mean-
ingfulness, i.e., reducing it to the absurd, to banality, 
to vacuity. As it is such an obvious and common-
place thing to notice that people are different from 
each other, it is really a waste of time (and of political 
energy) to go on about these differences—it is bor-
ing, facile and counter-productive. Yet the notion of 
difference within the minimal ethics outlined here is 
also, we might say … minimal. It refers to the ongoing 
process of differentiation that is immanent to matter, 
and hence to what we are calling “the world”, and that 
mainly occurs outside and beyond the human—but 
it still calls upon the human to take responsibility for 
the differentiating cuts into the flow of life s/he is her-
self making with his/her tongue, language, or tools. 
Minimal ethics for the Anthropocene is therefore less 
about building a better world as an external unity and 
more about making better cuts into that which we are 
naming the world. But, to avoid becoming yet another 
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masculinist enterprise which knows in advance and 
once and for all what it is striving for, the minimal eth-
ics proposed here has to embrace the very openness 
and vagueness of its premises. It needs to recognize in 
itself the indecency, the gaudiness, the masquerade of 
any attempt to make philosophy, and then to try and 
make it better—which perhaps means smaller, less 
posturing, less erect. 
Notes
14. In The Posthuman Braidotti interprets this state of events 
as indicative of a broader move away from various 
forms of more speculative critical theory in the early 
twenty-first century humanities: “It is as if, after the 
great explosion of theoretical creativity of the 1970s 
and 1980s, we had entered a zombified landscape of 
repetition without difference and lingering melancholia. 
A spectral dimension has seeped into our patterns of 
thinking, boosted, on the right of the political spectrum, 
by ideas about the end of ideological time (Fukuyama, 
1989) and the inevitability of civilizational crusades 
(Huntington, 1996). On the political left, on the other 
hand, the rejection of theory has resulted in a wave of 
resentment and negative thought against the previous 
intellectual generations. In this context of theory-
fatigue, neo-communist intellectuals (Badiou and Žižek, 
2009) have argued for the need to return to concrete 
political action, even violent antagonism if necessary, 
rather than indulge in more theoretical speculations. 
They have contributed to push the philosophical 
theories of post-structuralism out of fashion” (5).
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Chapter 7
Ethics
Ethics is a mode of human locatedness in the world 
which involves a recognition of the processual and 
unstable nature not only of any such locatedness but 
also of the human that is thus located. It also involves 
the human in giving an account of the modes of rela-
tionality that ensue. In this sense, ethics is not just 
about being-in but also about being-with. The proces-
sual and co-emergent nature of what we are calling 
the world applies to all sorts of thickenings of matter 
across different scales, as argued earlier. All beings in 
the world exist and emerge “with”. Humans are not 
the only beings that are capable of relating to and 
collaborating with others; they are also most prob-
ably not the only sentient beings that are capable of 
communicating with others, grasping others’ pain, 
causing violence to others but also withholding or at 
least minimizing violence. It is quite likely that what 
we conventionally refer to as moral behavior—actions 
that are compliant with a given group’s customs and 
social codes and that are aimed to produce benefi-
cial outcomes for this group, on a material or spiri-
tual level—is just a set of reactions to external and 
internal stimuli,15 reactions that then become a form 
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of learned behavior and that, in the human language, 
get elevated to the status of “goodness”. It is primar-
ily the linguistic labelling of certain types of behavior 
as “good”, “noble” and “honorable” that differentiates 
human acts towards other human and nonhuman 
entities and processes as “moral”. As a consequence, 
beings that humans designate as “animals” are always 
kept on the other side of morality, in a denigrated 
position described as “animality”.16 As John Mullarkey 
points out, “members of one group, Homo sapiens, 
have distributed among themselves every right and 
privilege through the course of an enlarging enfran-
chisement”. They have achieved this state of events 
by “invoking an identity that necessarily ostracises a 
vast out-group (‘non-human animals’ so called) to the 
extent of either defining them in some jurisdictions 
as non-sentient beings or practically treating them as 
such in most others” (97).
The point of the argument presented thus far is not 
to expand the notion of ethics to other sentient beings 
beyond the human. Indeed, such conceptual “expan-
sionism” only ends up confirming the singular human 
moral subject, with other beings (dolphins, apes) 
assessed on the basis of how closely they replicate 
human behavior and thus how closely they approach 
the human’s “humanity”.17 Instead, I propose to see 
ethics as a relatively narrow cultural practice, worked 
out by humans across history, as a form of regulating 
ways of co-existing and co-emerging with others. This 
cultural practice also involves providing an account—
verbally, experientially, or aesthetically—of these pro-
cesses of co-existence and co-emergence. In others 
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words, ethics could be described as a practice of not 
only becoming in and with the world but also of work-
ing out possibilities for what we will decide, through 
deliberation, policy work and conflict resolution, to 
be ways of becoming better in the world. Once again, 
this is not to deny that so-called animals are inca-
pable of enacting conventionally understood moral 
behavior such as empathy, cooperation, fairness or 
reciprocity, or that they may even turn out to be more 
successful than humans at displaying such behavior. 
It is just to propose to reserve the term “ethics” to 
that narrow spectrum of humans’ affective-cognitive 
responses and actions that involve giving an account 
of these behaviors, via the conventionally (even if not 
exclusively) human cultural practices such as philoso-
phy, story-telling and art. Put yet otherwise, ethics is 
a historically contingent human mode of becoming 
in the world, of becoming different from the world, 
and of narrating and taking responsibility for the 
nature of this difference. There are no prior limits to 
the applicability of this ethics, which is why we could 
say that it involves accounting for something as wide 
and abstract as “our place in the sun” (Levinas 1989: 
82-5). This account is necessary because any place in 
the universe I temporally occupy, and from which I 
build, consume, love and destroy, is never originally 
and duly mine: I am just a wayfarer through matter’s 
planetary unfoldings and thickenings. There is there-
fore a story-telling aspect to ethics.
The defense of ethics as a “better” mode of phi-
losophizing, one that precedes ontology and that 
makes a demand on being, comes from the thought 
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of Emmanuel Levinas. This precedence takes place 
on the level of justice: if ontology is a “philosophy 
of power” that reduces any ideas about what we are 
calling the world and its unfolding to the concep-
tual apparatus possessed by the cognizant subject 
(Levinas 1969: 46), ethics can be seen instead as the 
suspension of humans’ epistemological and hence 
domineering pretensions. This is not to say that we 
humans have to remain ignorant; it is just to suggest 
caution in getting to know things all too quickly and 
then constantly producing and reproducing behav-
ior and action, or ethics and politics, on the basis of 
this knowledge. Turning to Levinas in any work that 
aims to promote post-anthropocentric thinking the 
way this book does is of course not without problems, 
given the significant role ascribed to the human face 
as the source of ethical demand in his writings, and 
the marked (even if historically comprehensible, given 
the context of the Shoah) disinterestedness in other 
nonhuman forms of being and becoming. However, 
I argued elsewhere that Levinas’ “error” is first of all 
scientific and historical rather than philosophical, in 
that he does not consider seriously the limitations of 
his own concept of the human as a speaking being 
with the face, rather than a sentient being reaching 
to—and touched by—others in a myriad different 
ways (see Zylinska 2009: 57). Yet do we really know 
with whom we can enter into a discourse (a refugee? 
a dolphin? a computer bot?) and what this “enter-
ing into a discourse” actually means? Levinas’ ethics 
also does not go all the way in recognizing the mutual 
entanglement of “us” and “the world”: the boundaries 
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of Levinas’ “other”, even if not fully knowable, are nev-
ertheless transcendentally posited, rather than seen as 
immanent, as differentiation-from-within—which is 
the line of thought adopted in this book. 
The minimal ethics for the Anthropocene is there-
fore not Levinasian in any obvious sense but it does 
borrow its minimalist structuring from his rethinking 
of the edifice of Western philosophy, and especially 
of the relationship between ethics and politics. It also 
borrows from Levinas the sense of ethical obliga-
tion and responsibility as something inevitable that 
makes a demand on the human and that demands a 
response from him/her. It becomes, to cite Timothy 
Morton, a form of “radical openness to everything” 
(2010: 15). This openness in itself does not guaran-
tee the taking up of the ethical challenge by the thus 
interpellated human but it does position her as always 
already involved, obligated, entangled. In a counterar-
gument to neo-Darwinian theories of the selfish gene, 
Morton playfully argues that it is altruism rather than 
selfishness that can be said to be hardwired into real-
ity, since “we are made of others: we’ve literally got 
them under our skin” (119). Indeed, Lynn Margulis’ 
research into evolutionary biology (1998) has con-
clusively shown that, thanks to the age-old processes 
of genetic symbiosis we carry within ourselves traces 
of our microbial ancestors. Rather than being seen as 
Dawkins’ teleological “lumbering robots” equipped 
with the task of transmitting and hence preserving 
DNA for future generations of living beings, humans 
are posited here as always nomadic, as transient and 
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temporary stabilizations of life whose form emerges 
in relation with their environment. To use Bergson’s 
poetic language, 
life is like a current passing from germ to 
germ through the medium of a developed 
organism. It is as if the organism itself 
were only an excrescence, a bud caused to 
sprout by the former germ endeavoring to 
continue itself in a new germ. The essential 
thing is the continuous progress indefi-
nitely pursued, an invisible progress, on 
which each visible organism rides during 
the short interval of time given it to live. 
(1944: 32). 
From this vantage point, humans do not have any pre-
designed tasks, even at genetic level: they are just tem-
porarily stabilized processes that are as accidental as 
any others, and shorter-lived than most at that. 
It is through Bergson’s attention to life—as out-
lined in his Creative Evolution but formulated in more 
clearly ethical terms in The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion, that I aim to draw on Levinas’ ethical 
intimations. Mullarkey justifies such a philosophi-
cal encounter by arguing that “Bergsonism may best 
be read as an ethics of alterity fleshed out in empiri-
cal concerns” (107) but also that Levinas’ idea of 
relationality qua responsibility which is foundational 
to ethics has been influenced by Bergson. Indeed, 
Mullarkey goes so far as to suggest that “élan vital itself 
is but another way of thinking about alterity”, with 
Bergson’s absolutely new becoming the Levinasian 
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“Other” (109).18 If life itself amounts to the creation 
of forms ever new, the nature of social relations is also 
“an ongoing creation” (Mullarkey 1999: 88)—a line 
of argument that returns in the work of many con-
temporary thinkers of entanglement such as Haraway, 
Barad or Braidotti. With this perspective, as Mullarkey 
explains, “Bergson sidesteps the frozen essentialism 
of reductive naturalists as well as the liquid relativism 
of culturalists: society is indeed moulded by nature, 
but by a creative nature which in part tries to break its 
own moulds!” (89). 
The fact that we humans have literally got others 
under our skin does not yet make us unique amongst 
other beings, but the historical practice of reflecting 
on such forms of relationality with others, via phi-
losophy, story-telling and art, does. What is unique 
on the social level is therefore not the nature of these 
relations as such—indeed, they are part of the wider 
evolution of life—but rather the human possibil-
ity of taking (at least partial) responsibility for some 
of those relations, and giving (an equally partial) 
account of them. Our human responsibility can there-
fore be described as a form of experiential, corporeal 
and affective “worlding” in which we produce (knowl-
edge about) the world, seen as a set of relations and 
tasks. This may involve relating responsibly to other 
humans, but also to nonhuman beings and processes, 
including some extremely tiny and extremely com-
plex or even abstract ones (microbes, clouds, climate, 
global warming). Taking responsibility for something 
we cannot see is not easy. But, as Morton, argues, “it’s 
no tougher than taking responsibility for, say, not 
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killing—you don’t have to come up with a reason; you 
just do it and figure out why later. That’s why it’s called 
an ethical decision. It doesn’t have to be proved or 
justified. You just do it.” This is not an advocacy of an 
“anything goes” form of ethics; only a recognition that 
“one can act spontaneously and consciously” (2010: 
99, emphasis added). Our response is thus a way of 
taking responsibility for the multiplicity of the world, 
and for our relations to and with it. Such responsibil-
ity can always be denied or withdrawn, but a response 
will have already taken place nonetheless. However, 
an act of taking responsibility is not just a passive reac-
tion to pre-existing reality: it involves actively making 
cuts into the ongoing unfolding of matter in order to 
stabilize it. Ethical de-cisions can thus be best under-
stood as material in-cisions. 
The language of incisions and cuts highlights an 
important aspect of the ethics outlined here: the inev-
itability of violence as its constitutive element, rather 
than as something that should be expunged and over-
come the way Morton seems to suggest (2010: 127-
8). For me, dependency and violence are inevitable 
conditions of relationality and “worlding”. Given that 
the latter involves the voluntary and involuntary shap-
ing of matter across the geo- and biosphere, it may 
incur changing its temporary stabilizations, destroy-
ing things, causing pain to sentient beings or even 
killing them. Of course, such practices “should never 
leave their practitioners in moral comfort, sure of their 
righteousness”, as Donna Haraway poignantly empha-
sizes (2003: 75). The recognition of the inevitabil-
ity of violence in any relation does not take away the 
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injunction to both minimize the violence and reflect 
on it. In other words, it involves working towards 
what Levinas termed “good violence” (1969): a rup-
ture within the self which is made to face the differ-
ence and relate to it. There is no mutuality here: as 
mentioned before, this ethical responsibility is only 
ever not so much even human as it is mine. It is there-
fore singular, singularly allocated and enacted. Yet 
the subject of this ethics has nothing to do with the 
individualism and self-possession of normative moral 
theories: instead, it is decisively posthuman. Such a 
subject can be defined, after Braidotti, as relational, 
“constituted in and by multiplicity”; it is a subject 
“that works across differences and is also internally 
differentiated, but still grounded and accountable” 
(2013: 49). An ethical theory that embeds violence 
into its framework—rather than just sweeping it aside 
in a fantasy gesture of moral purification—promises 
to address the question of co-emergence and co-
dependency in all its complexity. This does not imply 
imposing moral equivalence between all forms of vio-
lence and all forms of dependency, even if we accept 
that “[a]ny act of identification, naming, or relation 
is a betrayal of and a violence toward the Other” 
(Calarco 2008: 136). 
Injunctions with regard to what this human should 
and should not do are of course never self-evident. 
There exists a long list of rather diverse and contra-
dictory injunctions issued by various philosophical 
and religious traditions, rooted in specific ideas with 
regard to the order of the universe and the human’s 
place and role in it. It is not my ambition to arbitrate 
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over those injunctions. I also aim to keep adding to 
this list to the minimum. To offset many moraliz-
ing aspects of such injunctions, the ethics presented 
here is therefore itself positioned as minimal, even 
though it operates at such large planetary and geo-
logical scales. It inscribes itself in “the philosophy of 
‘less than’” (Morton 2010: 119). As Morton puts it, 
“Seeing the Earth from space is the beginning of eco-
logical thinking. The first aeronauts, balloon pilots, 
immediately saw Earth as an alien world. Seeing your-
self from another point of view is the beginning of eth-
ics and politics” (2010: 14). Paradoxical as it sounds, 
the minimal injunction presented here is to think big, 
perhaps as big as we can, and then to issue the small-
est injunctions possible that will allow us to avoid a 
moralist trap. It is also to consider the philosophical 
and material possibility of human interconnectedness 
with other beings—and with cosmic matter itself—
but also to see the human him/herself as one more 
temporary cut made into the flow of matter.
Any such cuts into matter most often occur out-
side and beyond human consciousness, yet their rec-
ognition becomes vital in the production of the his-
torically specific practice called philosophy—and 
especially ethics. This latter statement gets us out of 
the dilemma of whether nonhuman animals can also 
think, perhaps in more complex ways than we real-
ize. Deep skepticism with regard to the uniqueness of 
human faculties does not mean denying the specific-
ity of descriptive and normative cultural articulations 
by the human—even if we are to agree that culture is 
just biology with a shorter time-span. The difference 
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of time difference, or thinking responsibly across and 
within different scales, is precisely what the minimal 
ethics for the Anthropocene outlined here stands for.
Notes
15. Steve Shaviro’s edited book, Cognition and Decision in 
Non-Human Biological Organisms, provides a helpful 
account of the problem of decision-as-reaction. His 
introduction to the volume is an excellent attempt to 
throw non-humanist light on our conventional ways of 
understanding such human-centric notions as thinking, 
decision-making and free will. 
16. This point is most cogently argued by Jacques Derrida in 
“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)”.
17. I have previously described this kind of argument, 
which can be seen, among others, in the work of such 
moral philosophers as John Finnis, John Harris and 
Peter Singer, as merely postulating a “stretched scale of 
personhood” (see Zylinska 2009: 11-17).
18. Mullarkey is careful, however, not to suggest an all-the-
way equivalence between the two thinkers, insisting 
that it is equally important to ponder the differences 
between them. He writes: “Bergson’s philosophy 
of life is too ontological for Levinas, too creative 
and active. Creation itself presupposes something 
more fundamental, according to Levinas, namely 
the revelation of human alterity. The philosophy 
of the élan is flawed because ‘it tends toward an 
impersonal pantheism’. This charge is undoubtedly 
true: Bergsonism is not a humanism but primarily 
a philosophy of time extended to all being. Levinas’ 
humanism is wrapped up in his phenomenology, for 
he clearly views time anthropologically in its essence 
[…] Without being rationalist, Levinas’ primacy of 
the subjective still remains classical in as much as it 
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disregards the value of non-human forms of life. […] 
however, Bergson’s anti-reductionism extends his vision 
of ethical irreducibility beyond the human psyche 
towards anything that genuinely endures” (110).

Fig. 9: Joanna Zylinska, Topia daedala 9, 2014
Chapter 8
Poetics
If we humans have a singular responsibility to give an 
account of the differentiations of matter, of which we 
are part, such practices of account-giving establish a 
constitutive link between ethics and poetics. Indeed, 
we encounter ethics precisely via stories and images, 
i.e., through textual and visual narratives—from 
sacred texts, works of literature and iconic paintings 
through to various sorts of media stories and images. 
It is in this sense, inherited from the Greeks, that 
products of human creative activity assembled under 
the general umbrella of “art” perform a poietic func-
tion: they bring forth realities, concepts and values. 
Art can therefore be described as world-making rather 
than just representational. Understood as the sup-
posed “sixth mass extinction of species in the history 
of life on Earth” (Heise 2010: 49), the Anthropocene 
acquires its meanings and values through certain types 
of artistic, or, more broadly, cultural interventions, 
both written and visual ones, most of which inscribe 
themselves in what Ursula Heise has described as “the 
rhetoric of decline”. In Heise’s words, 
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Many of these works deploy the genre con-
ventions of elegy and tragedy to construct 
narratives in which the endangerment or 
demise of a particular species functions 
not only as a synecdoche for the broader 
environmentalist idea of the decline of 
nature, but also comes to form part of sto-
ries that individual cultures tell about their 
own modernization. (52) 
My aim here is to explore several such apocalyptic 
narratives while also turning to some alternative cre-
ative interventions that allow us to reimagine life, 
death and extinction beyond the narrow fatalism and 
also beyond what we might term the “rescuism” of the 
dominant Anthropocene story. 
Demise and apocalypse seem to bring with them-
selves their own pleasures. Indeed, recent years have 
seen the proliferation of what might be best described 
as “extinction porn”. Stephen’s Emmott’s book One 
Billion cited in the first chapter would be a good exam-
ple of this genre; the TV series Life after People aired 
on History channel in 2008-2010 would be another. 
Each of the twenty episodes of Life after People starts 
with the ominous sounding line: “Welcome to Earth... 
Population: 0”. Viewers are then presented with a 
situation whereby all humans on Earth have become 
extinct, even though the program does not go into 
detail with regard to how this state of events has come 
about. We are merely faced with this still seemingly 
fresh and raw status quo, the disappearance of humans 
from Earth. Interestingly, each episode returns to the 
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very same zero point of “just after the extinction” to 
then present us with a timescale of several thousand 
years, showing us different types of urban and biologi-
cal decay occurring at different times—from the LA 
freeway system being overgrown with grass to the col-
lapse of the John Hancock Center building in Chicago. 
This freshly human-free world is nevertheless exactly 
like we know it: there are no signs of any environ-
mental, planetary or political catastrophe. In Life after 
People humans just seem to have been lifted off by an 
imaginary spaceship to a different planet, having left 
their surroundings exactly as we know them. At the 
same time, the program is actually full of humans, in 
the shape of various kinds of experts (including some 
bona fide scientists, such the British geologist and spe-
cialist of the Anthropocene Jan Zalasiewicz),19 who 
humor the production team by engaging in their own 
dreamy speculations about how long it will take for 
various man- and non-man-made bits of the environ-
ment to fall apart. All this is accompanied by state-of-
the-art computer simulations of collapsing buildings 
and overgrown cityscapes, seemingly transmitting the 
message from that other media-friendly scientist, Dr. 
John Hammond from the Jurassic Park sequel: “life 
will find a way”. 
The impressive computer graphics and animations 
in the series create a twenty-first century version of the 
sublime, with significant historical monuments such 
as the Sistine Chapel, the Washington Monument 
and Lenin’s Mausoleum, as well as smaller places 
and objects we hold dear, literally collapsing in front 
of our eyes. The “in front of our eyes” aspect of the 
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presentation is of course very important, as this pro-
gram about life after people is aimed at the very much 
present people, positioned in front of their different 
screens to watch with horror the repeated violation 
of all the things they have created and value through 
the period they refer to as “history”. As a result of 
various political developments, media audiences in 
recent years have been repeatedly exposed to images 
of tall buildings collapsing on their screens, thus being 
made to witness a new kind of “real screen trauma”. 
The distantiation effect created through these kinds 
of televisual maneuvers is important when it comes 
to looking at these overbearing images that inscribe 
themselves in the logic and aesthetic of the sublime. 
Kant claims that sublime landscapes “raise the forces 
of the soul above the height of vulgar commonplace, 
and discover within us a power of resistance of quite 
another kind, which gives us courage to be able to 
measure ourselves against the seeming omnipotence 
of nature”—but they do this only “provided our 
own position is secure” (110). The repetition of the 
trauma of extinction and the ensuing annihilation of 
the various monuments of human ingenuity in each 
episode of Life after People is aimed at shaking up the 
people on the other side of the screen while simulta-
neously restoring their sense of wholeness, control 
and peace, thus allowing them to enjoy the spectacle. 
Indeed, pleasure—which is the other key component 
of the sublime, alongside horror—is very much part 
of the experience. It springs from the relief which is 
related to the fact of survival, of surmounting the 
near-death experience one has been made to witness 
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but not really be part of. Life after People thus holds 
the Anthropocene at bay, foreclosing on the explora-
tion of any ethico-political issues it potentially brings 
up. In the last instance, the series only restores and 
strengthens the anthropos, who gave the name to 
this geological period—the same way gory horror 
movies do. Narcissism, self-interest and self-comfort 
thus overshadow any possibility of the emergence of 
an ethical response and ethical responsibility in rela-
tion to the predicted events. Retold in each episode, 
like a computer game, from the same starting point 
and according to the same visual algorithm, the story 
of the Anthropocene according to Life after People is 
ultimately nothing more than a celebration of human 
grandeur and thus a futile exercise in triumphalist 
survivalism.
Such exercises in survivalism, underpinned by 
human hubris as a supposedly optimal response to 
the horror of extinction and individual death, have 
now travelled from the armchairs of media audi-
ences enjoying all sorts of cinematic apocalypses to 
the labs of bio-resurrectionists. Positioning itself as 
being part of the wider conservation movement, the 
resurrection biology project, aka de-extinction or spe-
cies revivalism, has gained particular attention over 
recent years thanks to the concerted efforts to bring 
back the passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius), 
which became extinct in the early twentieth century. 
There has also been talk of reviving mammoths. Yet, 
as pointed out in the Scientific American editorial on 
the issue, “A program to restore extinct species poses 
a risk of selling the public on a false promise that 
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technology alone can solve our ongoing environ-
mental woes—an implicit assurance that if a species 
goes away, we can snap our fingers and bring it back” 
(non-pag.). Positioning organisms as singular entities 
that can be “re-inserted” into various environments 
rather than as mutually constituted with them, the 
de-extinction program sidesteps the broader issue of 
our responsibility towards the bio- and geo-sphere by 
focusing on individualistic successes of the survival 
and revival of “charismatic megafauna” (Heise 2010: 
60): the useful and the cute. Suffering precisely from 
the derangement of scale critiqued in chapter two 
as well as overlooking the complex multi-scalar rela-
tions and processes that shape cross-species popula-
tions, it reduces any efforts to supposedly “conserve” 
and bring back certain species to a human exercise 
in species vanity, a capital-fuelled effort to beget life 
in a godlike manner. Matter is deprived here of any 
vitality of its own and reduced to a mere substrate for 
human creation, albeit one that requires a good dose 
of venture capital for this process of creation to be car-
ried through.
What else can we do with matter, in its crudest 
forms? How can we reinvent life (and death) other-
wise, beyond the instrumental, the narcissistic and the 
pointless? I would like to see these as more than just 
technical questions that call for an engineering solu-
tion. Instead, in what follows I want to explore the 
practical possibility of bending raw matter in order to 
create things, of twisting, turning and splicing matter, 
of overcoming its resistance—in a way that exceeds 
the rather conservative efforts of bio-resurrectionists. 
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With this, I want to take issue with the reductionism 
of many scientific endeavors to either resurrect life 
or create it from scratch (for example, in the recent 
experiments in synthetic biology), with life being 
reduced to sequences of data that can be easily embed-
ded in different media. Life here is basically another 
version of “the soul”. This kind of logic underpins the 
de-extinction project, especially its dominant section 
that promotes extracting DNA fragments from pre-
served specimens and implanting them in the live spe-
cies (such as band-tailed pigeons) who would become 
surrogate parents. The disembodied view of informa-
tion as reducible to the essence of life remains bur-
dened with the metaphysical baggage of the previous 
centuries, including the dualist distinctions between 
mind and body, materialism and idealism, transcen-
dence and immanence. 
This dualism is poignantly reflected in the words of 
the popular culture icon, wise man Yoda, in Star Wars 
V: The Empire Strikes Back: “Life creates it, makes it 
grow. Its energy surrounds us and binds us. Luminous 
beings are we, not this crude matter”. Crude matter is 
clearly the opposite of life here; it is seen as something 
that needs an external intervention, a spark, an intel-
ligence, or perhaps just an injection of Craig Venter’s 
capital, to make it alive. In this famous opera of cos-
mic good and evil, crude matter is presented as just 
crude: inert, unintelligent, dead. Yet what if we were to 
redeem crude matter as a site of potentiality while at 
the same time bringing back materiality to the prob-
lem of life creation? Leaving behind the mammoth 
or the pigeon, I would like to turn to the Judaic figure 
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of the Golem as a living being made from mud that 
approximates, but also potentially threatens, its cre-
ator. I suggest we can see the Golem’s wisdom and 
practice as that of an anti-Yoda: as a reclamation of 
crude matter that always already inheres a potential-
ity but also as an abandonment of an idea of a “some-
thing else”. Indeed, the Golem can teach us how to get 
our hands and minds dirty with the matter of matter, 
how to think and play with it, and thus with ourselves 
and our surroundings, in order to think and make 
life better.
I come to the Golem story and the way it engages 
with the matter of crude matter via the artistic prac-
tice of the Australian duo Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, 
who, at the University of Western Australia, have set 
up a laboratory called SymbioticA and a research 
initiative called the Tissue Culture and Art Project. 
In a presentation given in Prague in 2013—a city in 
which the famous Rabbi Loew ben Bezalel is said to 
have created a Golem in order to defend the Prague 
ghetto against pogroms and anti-Semitic attacks—
the artists pointed to an emergence of an interesting 
phenomenon in recent academic discussions in the 
domains of cultural studies, media theory and art. 
While life is being increasingly instrumentalized and 
isolated from its original context to become a prod-
uct for human manipulation, matter—whether living, 
semi living or non-living—is attributed with vital-
ity and agency. This philosophical trend, inspired by 
the work of Gilles Deleuze, Manuel de Landa, Jane 
Bennett and others, has gained the name “new materi-
alism”. For Catts and Zurr this phenomenon “blurs the 
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perceptual (and technological) boundaries between 
what we consider living, semi living and non-living” 
(2013: non-pag.). 
One of Catts and Zurr’s recent art works, which, 
like their previous pieces, is an attempt to explore pre-
cisely this instability between the living, the semi-liv-
ing and the non-living, is actually titled Crude Matter. 
The piece is concerned with the importance of sub-
strate—that is context—for life. Drawing on current 
biology research, Catts and Zurr argue that context is 
as vital to the development of life and its differentia-
tion as genetic code. Referencing the paper “Substrate 
stiffness affects early differentiation events in embry-
onic stem cells” by Evans et al., they point out that dif-
ferentiation of stem cells depends very much on the 
extra-cellular matrices on which cells grow. Even a 
subtle change in substrate consistency will have a fun-
damental effect on the plasticity of cells and the lin-
eage they will take—i.e., on what type of tissue they 
will become: fat, bone, etc. This is the science that 
underpins their Crude Matter project, which is loosely 
based on the story of the Golem. The artists explain 
the project in following terms:
We are exploring the “alchemy like” trans-
formation of materials into active sub-
strates which have the ability to act as 
surrogates and upon life. The story of the 
Golem described the emergence of life 
from inanimate matter (mud); life that was 
forceful but brute and could be precari-
ously shaped for different purposes and 
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intentions. Some say that the body (or the 
clay dust remains) is still in the attic of the 
New Old Synagogue of Prague. Our aim is 
to explore, in a poetic way, and bring back 
into the forefront the materiality of life in 
context. This is to differ from the hege-
mony of the metaphor of life as a code, 
and the following postulation that life can 
be controlled. Drawing on historical ref-
erences taken from the middle ages, we 
would like to look at engineered life that 
is on the edges of the what we consider 
animate or in animate—and provide it 
with some sort of agency, even if symbolic. 
(2013: non-pag.)
Their Crude Matter installation, shown at KGLU 
Gallery in Slovenj Gradec, Slovenia, and Łaźnia 
Centre for Contemporary Art in Gdańsk, Poland, 
in 2012 is made up from local mud, ceramics, syn-
thetic grass, tissues grown on  the PDMS substrate 
and micro-channels imprinted on  glass. The artists 
aim to dig out soil from historically significant places 
(the banks of the Vltava (Moldau) river in Prague—
from which, according to the legend, the Golem was 
formed, and a 1942 crash site of a German Junker 88 
bomber in the very far north of Finland) and grow life 
from it, while also allowing it to die—thus trying to 
understand the relationship between cells and their 
environment. They claim that the piece “destabilises 
the engineering logic of the transformation of life into 
raw material” while also challenging the privileging of 
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the information embedded in DNA over the context 
in which life operates. “Crude Matter is touching upon 
the creation of life from crude matter and human 
knowledge; when human hubris and life should not 
mixed”, they say.20 The work of Catts and Zurr poses 
the question of what we can we do with crude mat-
ter in a way that would take issue with the humanism 
implied by this very query (as human agency over 
some external and inchoate mass is claimed up-front), 
while also remaining critical of the human hubris that 
underpins many of our contemporary Golem proj-
ects, especially those in the corporate biotech world. 
Indeed, Catts and Zurr are equally interested in what 
crude matter can do with us and to us while also reveal-
ing that matter is not and has never been just “crude”, 
even though it has suited us humans to imagine it in 
this way. Instead, matter has been other than itself, or, 
to use another recently popular term, “relational”. 
There are a number of other artists (associated 
with the label “bioart” the way Catts and Zurr also 
are) whose work takes this relational and contextual 
approach to the question of life and its locatedness 
in—and emergence from—matter. Bioart, or a genre 
of art that engages with life in its fleshy, material way, 
is an area in which life is being put to the test, beyond 
any instrumental or reparatory ambitions.21 In one of 
their earlier project, Catts and Zurr grew a “semi-liv-
ing coat” out of immortalized cell lines, which formed 
a living layer of tissue supported by a biodegradable 
polymer matrix. Displayed in a glass sphere connected 
to various test tubes, the tiny garment-like object, 
branded Victimless Leather, brings to the fore, in their 
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own words, “the moral implications of wearing parts 
of dead animals for protective and aesthetic reasons”,22 
while also engaging us in a visceral reflection on our 
use of living systems in everyday life. Another example 
of enacting the relationality of matter otherwise is a 
project called Blender by Australian artists Stelarc and 
Nina Sellars. Blender is a vibrant installation consist-
ing of a large glass capsule in which liquid biomaterial 
(such as subcutaneous fat from both artists’ bodies, 
obtained via liposuction) bubbles and sloshes about, 
accompanied by the regular clicking sound of the 
blending mechanism’s switch, which creates a pulse-
like effect. Life’s effervescence is poignantly embraced 
in Eduardo Kac’s “plantimal” Edunia—a handsomely 
growing genetically engineered pinkish flower which 
is a hybrid of the artist and a petunia, with the art-
ist’s own DNA expressed in the red veins traversing 
the petals. 
Yet I want to suggest that it is not so much its dar-
ing or even blasphemous novelty that makes bioart 
worth our attention. Rather, it is what happens to life 
itself within bioartistic practice that opens up the most 
interesting set of possibilities—for artists, philoso-
phers, scientists, engineers and a wider public. These 
possibilities are not just visual but also material, and 
thus we may say, ontological: they concern the very 
nature of existence in time, and of what we under-
stand by the seemingly self-evident concepts such as 
intelligence; sex and reproduction; the body; and the 
very concept of being alive. In works such as those by 
the Tissue Culture and Art Project, Stelarc and Sellars 
or Kac life is being re-created, pushed to the limit, 
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remolded, remediated, cut and spliced back again. 
Bioartists can thus be said to take art’s creative imper-
ative to a different level, echoing to an extent what 
Bergson termed “creative evolution”—a form of life’s 
unfolding which does not proceed in straight vertical 
lines according to a pre-designed formula but which 
rather entails the possibility of creating some “real 
novelty”, or what Sarah Kember has termed “life-as-
it-could-be” (2006: non-pag.). This is not to say that 
novelty is desirable under any circumstances, or that 
it is inherently progressive and good. Nor is it to assert 
that bioart remains outside the dominant cultural 
norms, or that the creative impulse which underpins 
their practice releases artists involved in the manipu-
lation of life at genetic, cellular or tissue level from 
wider social conventions and obligations. We should 
therefore by all means give due consideration to ques-
tions concerning artists’ rights and moral obligations 
that frequently get raised in debates surrounding bio-
art: questions as to whether artists have the right to 
create and manipulate life and to “play God” the way 
Rabi Loeb did with his Prague Golem made out of 
the soil of the Vltava river, whether it is “moral” to do 
so, and whether life as such does not deserve some kind 
of protection from the possible excesses of some irre-
sponsible experimenters—excesses that the twentieth 
century in particular witnessed in high number. 
However, I also want to suggest that the most 
important work of invention undertaken by many 
bioartists occurs not so much on an ontological level 
but rather on an ethical one. We could perhaps go so 
far as to suggest that artistic experiments of this kind 
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furnish what might be described as an “ethics lab”, 
whereby it is not just life that is experimented on 
but also the normative frameworks through which it 
can be approached and dealt with. If acting ethically 
involves making cuts to the flow of life, as I suggested 
in chapter three, then we need to acknowledge that 
those cuts are going to be both material (involving the 
cutting and splicing of genes or cells) and rhetorical. 
In performing (bio)ethics with their work, bioartists 
seem to be taking heed of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophical imperative to approach problems of the 
world not just by saying what we already know about 
it but first of all by inventing new concepts—a pro-
cess which for the authors of What Is Philosophy? is a 
“matter of articulation, of cutting and cross-cutting” 
(1994: 16). Bioart can thus be described as being 
involved in the twin processes of inventing life and 
cutting through life—with a double-edged scalpel of 
responsibility and necessity. This is to say that cutting, 
both material and rhetorical, is inevitable, but also 
that the kinds of incisions that we are going to make 
into life matter. Indeed, they matter also in an ethical 
sense, which will have to be decided anew in various 
contexts. Since this nebulous entity called “life” is 
itself in the process of being re/created in the artistic 
experiments and their articulations, there is of course 
no reason to posit “life” as a value in advance. As Rosi 
Braidotti argues, life is a “fundamentally amoral force, 
the true nature of which is best expressed in its relent-
less generative power. There is no implicit a priori 
difference between cancer and birth, or between a 
malignant proliferation of cells in cancer and the 
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benign proliferation induced by pregnancy” (2006: 
223). Seeing life as a force, a dynamic movement, an 
unfolding of potentialities which are often unknown 
in advance carries with it both a suspension of onto-
logical certainty and an ethical imperative to cut well 
into life, to make good things with it. Rather than pos-
ited as a prior value, life becomes a minimum condi-
tion of any ethical framework—and of there being 
those who can exercise and act on that condition. To 
cite Braidotti again, “Ethics is a thin barrier against 
the possibility of extinction. It is a mode of actual-
izing sustainable forms of transformation” (217). It 
is therefore the protection of this condition, of the 
possibility of life’s unfolding—but not necessarily a 
protection of this or that life form—that constitutes a 
minor injunction for our ethics for the Anthropocene. 
This injunction always needs to be coupled with two 
others: to cut well into life and to respond well to life 
already formed (or, as we may also put it, “temporar-
ily stabilized”): to entities, beings, organs, cells—as 
well as elephants and band-tailed pigeons that are still 
with us. It also means taking responsibility for the life 
of the other, be it another human, a Golem or a slime 
mold, but not necessarily in the same way. 
The imperative to “invent well” is derived from 
humans’ capacity for developing empathy with other 
life forms, for being sentient with and about them, 
and for being able to theorize this shared sentience. 
However, it is precisely the moment of reflection on 
that capacity and the forms of affect it generates that 
is a condition for any such living encounter being 
ethical. (Otherwise there is a danger of cuteness or 
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media-induced charisma becoming a moral value.) 
We could therefore suggest that bioartists, busying 
themselves in their “ethics labs,” are twenty-first cen-
tury science-philosophers, who, like Rabbi Loew 
with his Golem, are both making life and making 
rules about life. But they do need to take responsibil-
ity for their own situatedness in life: for their engage-
ment with matter and for their differentiation from it. 
Of course, not all bioartists are ethical in this sense, 
with many reneging on their minimal “critical vitalist 
imperative” to create life and to reflect on it. But the 
interesting even if rare examples of “good invention” 
can turn bioart into an important tester of our moral 
hierarchies — of how we value certain life forms more 
than others, and of how we cut through matter, to 
make life better.
Notes
19. Zalasiewicz’s publications on the Anthropocene include 
a co-authored chapter “Anthropocene” in A Geologic 
Time Scale and a book, The Earth After Us: The Legacy 
That Humans Will Leave In The Rocks.       
20. Project description for the Crude Matter exhibition 
at KGLU Gallery in Slovenj Gradec, Slovenia, 2012, 
http://kiblix.org/kiblix2012/softcontrol/?p=103.
21. The material on bioart included in the last third of 
this chapter has been adopted from Joanna Zylinska. 
“Taking Responsibility for Life: Bioethics and Bioart”. 
In: Paul Macneill (ed.) Ethics and the Arts. Series: 
Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy/ LOET. 
Amsterdam: Springer, 2014.
Poetics 121
22. The Tissue Culture and Art Project website, 
http://www.tca.uwa.edu.au/vl/vl.html, accessed 
January 20, 2014.
Fig. 10: Joanna Zylinska, Topia daedala 10, 2014
Chapter 9
Politics
Hopefully by now the reader has a sense that the 
Anthropocene is a really serious matter, one that 
requires our attention as both critical theorists and 
living, breathing organism that are preoccupied—and 
that ought to be preoccupied—on an intellectual and 
a visceral level, with ensuring the continued possibil-
ity of life. I am referring here both to individual life 
and to the life of whole populations, or even species. 
This ethical injunction therefore immediately opens 
up onto a political task, one that involves having to 
negotiate between conflicting demands, work through 
antagonisms arising from opposite and sometimes 
even irreconcilable positions, and calculate between 
various options available to us. To say this is to counter 
the accusation issued by certain political philosophers 
that ethics is just a replacement problem, or even 
an individualized neoliberal strategy that prevents 
us from analyzing bigger issues, planning collective 
action and working against injustice or catastrophes 
on a global level. Indeed, my argument here (as in my 
previous work) is that ethics must be foundational to 
politics: it needs to prepare the ground for political 
work in which responsibilities are always shared and 
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demands conflicting. Unless we engage in the work of 
ethics that involves a reflection on our own constitu-
tion of values, we run the risk of unreformed moral-
ism being passed off as politics. I would go so far as 
to say that there can be no political urgency urgent 
enough that could serve as a justification for abandon-
ing the foundational and structural work of ethics. 
Many political projects of different orientation have 
failed precisely because of their proponents’ inabil-
ity, or unwillingness, to reflect on the constitution of 
their own values: their idea of justice and “good”, their 
clamor for a “better tomorrow”—which is likely to be 
someone else’s horizon of horror. 
It goes without saying that the Anthropocene 
presents itself to us as a political problem, but it does 
require at least a minimal dose of ethical reflection if 
a politics it is to usher in is to be both truly effective 
and truly political. The constitution of this kind of 
ethical reflection in preparation for a more consider-
ate and more effective politics of the Anthropocene is 
precisely the ambition of this book, even if, or in fact 
precisely because of the fact that, this term carries a 
certain geo-temporal urgency. Minimal ethics for the 
Anthropocene is to serve as a caution against under-
standing the Anthropocene too well and too quickly, 
and against knowing precisely how to solve the prob-
lems it represents. The task of such minimal ethics, as 
argued earlier, is to pose the Anthropocene as an ethi-
cal injunction. However, this injunction also entails 
the requirement to remain critical towards the very 
concept of the Anthropocene and the way it is framed 
in the current debates, both academic and mainstream 
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ones—not in order to reject it, but in order to develop 
a more complex and more responsible discourse on 
the Anthropocene, as well as facilitating a better polit-
ical response to it. The three issues that require par-
ticular attention, as already discussed throughout this 
book, are the underpinning masculinism, solution-
ism and scientism of this discourse—all manifested, 
to return to a quote from Darin Barney included in 
the first chapter, “the sort of bravado whereby men 
seek to exert control over everything around them 
by the force of instrumental rationality” (non-pag.). 
The interpellation here is not to impose women-only 
activism, suspend any search for solutions or bash sci-
ence: it is only to keep a check on some of the excesses 
that have come to the fore in the debate on the subject 
to date. The conclusion that emerges from the above 
is that critical thinking is one of the forms that politics 
of the Anthropocene can or even has to take. Indeed, 
perhaps thinking is the most political thing we can do 
with regard to the Anthropocene, before we go and do 
anything else. This should not be mistaken for a sign 
of resignation or quietism in the face of a planetary 
task. As Dave Boothroyd observes, “Thinking is doing 
something even if from the outside it looks like doing 
nothing” (16). 
If the Anthropocene raises questions of decay, 
destruction and death on a much larger, deeper and 
more significant scale than many of the previous polit-
ical figurations, such as “the Iron Curtain”, “Al-Qaeda” 
or “globalization”, it is also arguably a game changer 
with regard to the established political models and for-
mats. Indeed, it requires a reworking of the positions, 
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allegiances and frameworks, as well as of some of the 
fundamental concepts that underpin them, such as 
freedom, justice and life itself. As pointed out by his-
torian Dipesh Chakrabarty in his by now well-cited 
article on the Anthropocene, 
Climate change, refracted through global 
capital, will no doubt accentuate the logic 
of inequality that runs through the rule 
of capital; some people will no doubt 
gain temporarily at the expense of others. 
But the whole crisis cannot be reduced 
to a story of capitalism. Unlike in the cri-
ses of capitalism, there are no lifeboats 
here for the rich and the privileged (wit-
ness the drought in Australia or recent 
fires in the wealthy neighborhoods of 
California). (non-pag.)
Chakrabarty’s article is not free from the masculinism 
and scientism that characterizes many other humani-
ties writers on the Anthropocene, and it ends up 
reaffirming a reformulated form of humanism, with 
a sprinkling of old-style liberalism. Yet his analysis 
does raise the important question of directionality 
for the left with regard to the critique it forges and 
the future it envisages—for itself, for humanity and 
for “the world”. The imminent depletion of our plan-
et’s reserves, dubbed an “eco-eco disaster” by Tom 
Cohen, pushes us to revise politics as a matter of “the 
‘economical and ‘ecological’ tandem” (2012: 14). 
This brings up not just the question of how we can 
define “a political subject of climate change” (Cohen 
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2012: 18) who is at the same time a subject of eco-
nomic injustice, labor scarcity and bad debt, but also 
the problem of whether we should perhaps remain 
suspicious towards any attempts to fix a political sub-
ject in its identitarian position as a wounded self that 
can then retroactively respond to a situation. Instead, 
would a more potent political strategy not need to 
mobilize a distributed, relational and even partly non-
human subjectivity as both its agent and an object of 
its attention? Cohen suggests that, if we take on board 
the issue of climate change and the human-led trans-
formation of the geo- and biosphere, what we call the 
“political” needs to “migrate from an exclusively social 
category (Aristotle), as it has been defined in rela-
tion to the polity, to a cognitive or epistemographic 
zone” (24). This is to say, the arena of politics has to 
become much more expanded but it also requires a 
conscious effort on the part of those of us who want 
to actively participate in it to relearn and reimagine 
its geopolitical and geomoral configurations, to see 
anew where political urgency currently lies. Also, if 
the Anthropocene is defined as a crisis of scarcity, in 
the sense that humans are said to have almost used up 
the existent resources of the planet they call home, it 
is also worth asking, with Arundhati Roy, “What hap-
pens once democracy has been used up?”. Speaking 
from the position of someone who deeply cares 
about the democratic ideal, she nevertheless offers a 
damning indictment of its enactment in the so-called 
global world: 
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Could it be that democracy is such a hit 
with modern humans precisely because it 
mirrors our greatest folly—our nearsight-
edness? Our inability to live entirely in 
the present (like most animals do) com-
bined with our inability to see very far into 
the future makes us strange in-between 
creatures, neither beast nor prophet. Our 
amazing intelligence seems to have out-
stripped our instinct for survival. We plun-
der the earth hoping that accumulating 
material surplus will make up for the pro-
found, unfathomable thing that we have 
lost. (non-pag.)
For Roy, the problem lies in the actual strategies we 
have used across the globe precisely in the name of 
democracy—strategies that have led it to fuse with 
the free market into a predatory mechanism whose 
sole rationale is the maximization of profit. In India, 
which is the focus of her analysis—although the 
examples can be extrapolated to other developing 
countries too—this has involved making sudden and 
drastic decisions with regard to the building of dams, 
which has led to the submerging of inhabited lands by 
water; massive land acquisitions at gunpoint; the bull-
dozing of acres of living areas; the uncontrolled pol-
lution of rivers and the unprecedented increase in car 
use and electronics consumption. While the scarcity 
of natural resources, especially fossil fuels, is a famil-
iar line of argument with regard to the Anthropocene, 
Roy points to something that may initially sound 
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counter-intuitive: namely, that the very political 
framework that underpins the foundational notions 
of democracy such as popular sovereignty, political 
equality and freedom to choose political representa-
tion may have become exhausted through its overex-
ploitation by the demands of the global and local mar-
ket. Uncared for, democracy is reduced into a mere 
shadow of its former self, serving mainly the inter-
ests of those who do not really care enough, or even 
understand what it means to care, about the future of 
the polis in all its bio- and geo-political dimensions.
However, there is a certain paradox at work in try-
ing to combat the political self-interest that has got us 
to where we are. It lies in the fact that many efforts to 
respond to the Anthropocene actually mobilize a cer-
tain notion of speciecist, or more precisely humanist, 
self-interest—to combat self-interest! Political theo-
rist Jane Bennett is aware of this problem but remains 
unapologetic when she asks: “Should we try to detach 
geologic sensibility from all notions of self-interest? Is 
it really possible, given our current evolutionary form, 
to live according to the maxim that ‘while the human 
species can’t get along without the geologic, the geo-
logic will continue on in some form or other long after 
we have ceased being part of it?’” (2012: 246). This is 
of course a pertinent query, one that drives many cur-
rent scientific and philosophical efforts to respond 
to the supposed urgency of the current geopolitical 
moment in order to ensure a better life, politically and 
biologically, for both ourselves and the future genera-
tions, and to prolong that life in the shape and form 
that is considered more sustainable or even salutary 
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at both micro and macro scales. However, it may also 
be worth asking what it means for a politics of the 
Anthropocene to be principally driven by species nar-
cissism, or a desire for human survival? How will it 
differ from some of the worst excesses of materialist 
politics, whereby the definition of materialism is less 
Epicureanist and more Gordon Geckoist? To put it 
really crudely—and perhaps also unfairly to Bennett, 
whose own political orientations lie very much on the 
left—how do we ensure her position is differentiated 
from pronouncements such as those by Conservative 
politician and London mayor Boris Johnson, who, 
as reported by The Guardian, in the 2013 Margaret 
Thatcher lecture “mocked the 16% ‘of our species’ 
with an IQ below 85 as he called for more to be done 
to help the 2% of the population who have an IQ 
above 130”. Johnson said: “Whatever you may think 
of the value of IQ tests it is surely relevant to a con-
versation about equality that as many as 16% of our 
species have an IQ below 85 while about 2% … The 
harder you shake the pack the easier it will be for some 
cornflakes to get to the top”.23 Indeed, if this desire for 
survival is seen as primarily natural (as this is how we 
have evolved, according to Bennett), how will we guar-
antee it does not result in the short-termism of goal 
and the return to organicism she is so keen to escape 
otherwise? Does her acknowledgement in Vibrant 
Matter that she shares Epicureanist monism’s “convic-
tion that there remains a natural tendency to the way 
things are—and that human decency and a decent 
politics are fostered if we tune in to the strange logic 
of turbulence” (2010: xi) not assume the existence of 
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a whole group of some rather nice people who will all 
agree in advance, by tendency, osmosis or just through 
their plain good upbringing, what “human decency” 
is and what a “decent politics” will look like? 
Indeed, I would risk saying that Bennet’s poli-
tics is not political enough because it forecloses on 
the examination of narcissism, or, more broadly—its 
own affective investment in the idea of survival, life 
as energy and vibrant matter—at the heart of politics. 
While I agree with her that “Affirming the geo-mode 
of long time also holds promise for lifting American 
political discourse above its currently idiocy, wherein 
crucial issues like climate change are elided for the 
sake of moralistic red herrings or theo-populist slo-
gans” (2012: 245), I am more concerned about the 
moralism of eco-eco politics. Indeed, I fear that it may 
end up reducing any political efforts to self-interest on 
a mega scale, while also remaining inattentive to the 
cuts, small interventions (made also by, but mainly 
to, those “idiotic Americans” with their idiotic dis-
courses, not the nice decent people who all agree on 
the idea of human decency) with regard to their cur-
rent situation, both geographical and socio-economic. 
I wonder whether what Bennett ends up proposing, 
together with many other theorists of critical envi-
ronment studies—even those who have gone to great 
lengths to raise questions for the established ideas of 
“nature” and “the environment”—is not just a poli-
tics for those who like (deconstructed) nature a lot, 
with matter becoming “the new nature”. The politics 
of vibrant matter therefore risks looking like a middle-
class affectation, one aimed at people who read critical 
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theory but also have a preference for organic food, 
shop at farmer’s markets, like getting out of the city 
now and again, and generally are “anti-consumerist”: 
basically, nice affluent moralists who are doing their 
bit for the planet while also suffering not just from 
derangements of scale but also derangements of their 
own decency. Incidentally, the notion of decency is 
one evoked most frequently by the UK Conservative 
party, whose aim is to “help you and hardworking 
people in your area”.24 
Now, I absolutely agree with Bennett and other 
theorists of nonantropocentric thought about the 
need to perceive agency as distributed amongst 
human and nonhuman actors, some of whom/which 
are unstable and difficult to see (by us), and thus to 
recognize that our own belief in the possibility of 
controlling every aspect of the unfolding matter is 
nothing but a delusion. Indeed, unless we take into 
account the agential force of nonhuman phenomena 
and objects, we risk being unable to truly intervene 
into things. Yet it also seems to me that the politics 
for the Anthropocene will have to come to terms 
with what Chantal Mouffe has called “the democratic 
paradox”—for which there is no room in Bennett’s 
flat ontologies. The democratic paradox signifies 
that the liberal democratic idea of “human rights,” 
for example, if applied to its logical conclusion, will 
always inevitably jeopardize someone else’s existing 
rights. Mouffe emphasizes that it is important for us 
to understand that in a liberal democracy there always 
exists “a constitutive tension” between different log-
ics, grammars or articulations (say, of ideas of God, 
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freedom, nature, justice, property, dignity, etc.), “a 
tension that can never be overcome but only negoti-
ated in different ways” (5). Mouffe does not naïvely 
advocate any kind of straightforward resolution of 
such tension premised on a liberal rational argument 
as the latter will inevitably entail its own constitutive 
blind spots, but rather offers (discursive, but perhaps 
also bodily—i.e., involving the opponent’s gestures, 
breath, spit) “contamination” as the best resolution we 
can hope for (10).
When talking about articulation here we are back 
in a somewhat constrained realm of human discourse, 
but at the same time we have to acknowledge humans’ 
constant and ongoing entanglement with other enti-
ties and processes. I am therefore happy to borrow 
from Bennett the notion of “political ecologies” and 
to acknowledge, with her, “nonhuman materialities 
as participants in a political ecology”. Importantly, 
Bennett herself goes to great trouble not to claim 
“that everything is always a participant, or that all par-
ticipants are alike”. Indeed, she insists that “Persons, 
worms, leaves, bacteria, metals, and hurricanes have 
different types and degrees of power” (2010: 108). 
However, even if “A vital materialist theory of democ-
racy seeks to transform the divide between speaking 
subjects and mute objects into a set of differential ten-
dencies and variable capacities” (2010: 107-8), ques-
tions arise with regard to the inadequately theorized 
(even if not unacknowledged)25 moments of articu-
lation on the part of the materialist philosopher who 
speaks about and for other actors. The problem here 
is that the philosopher has already claimed his or her 
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articulatory ground: by philosophizing, in the rather 
conventional humanist medium of the book (most 
often made of dead trees, no less!), about things that 
have already been muted once they have been con-
stituted as objects of discourse, especially if the rela-
tions into which they have been made to enter include 
notions such as decency, sustainability and vigor. 
What is therefore troubling for me about all this is the 
lack of adequate examination on the part of the many 
philosophers of materialism and materiality of their 
own affective investment in, as well as of their role in 
constituting, the discourse about politics. 
Even the apparently hospitable and generous 
gesture of opening up the political ecology to other 
actors is enacted from the position of the established 
practice of philosophical exegesis—while remain-
ing constrained by uninterrogated notions such as 
“decency” and “vibrancy”. Consequently, “there still 
lingers the notion of, and a longing for, a present 
underlying foundation and/or truth in some political 
and theoretical movements and writings” (Bruining 
2013: 150),26 even or maybe especially those that 
explicitly disavow any such foundationalism. Indeed, 
even though matter for Bennett entails violent ten-
dencies, her description of it is like that of a really 
lovely and bubbly friend: Bennettian matter is “vital, 
energetic, lively, quivering, vibratory, evanescent, and 
effluescent” (Bennett 2010: 112)—very much unlike 
the life-draining, low-in-energy, cantankerous, old-
school critical theorist who can only find problems 
with things… The more substantial issue with this 
approach lies not in the recognition of the existence of 
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matter as such but rather in what Dennis Bruining has 
termed “material foundationalism”, an approach “in 
which matter translates and comes to signify an exi-
gency of life” (149). In works of so-called “new mate-
rialism” such as Bennett’s matter tends to be posited 
as “a priori and as, allegedly, beyond culture, despite 
an awareness of the untenability of such claims” 
(Bruining 2013: 151). Yet the positing of such mat-
ter can only be premised on the simultaneous occlu-
sion of the humanist values that underpin such a 
philosophical “positing gesture”—not to mention the 
reintroduction of the old-style Cartesianism, except 
that now the principal driver of agency is on the side 
of “matter” rather than “the mind” (see Bruining 
2013: 158). 
Another problem with this new “rediscovered” 
matter and all its posited foundationalism is that it 
assumes a community of those who call themselves 
human who supposedly experience and “feel” it 
strongly enough, in the sense that relationality across 
strata and scales becomes meaningful enough for them 
as something to shape their world-view—rather than 
as something, say, too overwhelming, too general or 
even too banal to consider. In the same way that it is 
much easier to “do animal studies” if you really “like” 
animals (even though the latter position can lead to 
the similar kind of moralizing critiqued in this chap-
ter and end up producing positions that are actually 
anti-philosophical), it is much easier to “do material-
ist ecopolitics” if you feel energized by (all kind of talk 
of) matter. 
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To close off this chapter I would therefore like to 
propose the possibility of outlining a politics for the 
Anthropocene from a different place than species nar-
cissism or enthusiastically sensed materialist affinity 
with things “out there”, across the universe. We can 
call it an ironic politics for city lovers—for those for 
whom matter is not a bubbly friend, for whom “it” 
does not move just like “wind” (120) but more like a 
Porsche, and for whom philosophizing, storytelling 
and art-making function as inevitable technical pros-
theses for a human engaged in the theorization of mat-
ter—or, indeed, in the theorization of anything else. 
Notes
23. http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/
nov/27/boris-johnson-thatcher-greed-good, accessed 
December 2, 2013.
24. http://www.conservatives.com/, accessed 
December 2, 2013.
25. Indeed, Bennett self-consciously comments: “I court 
the charge of performative self-contradiction: is it 
not a human subject who, after all, is articulating this 
theory of vibrant matter? Yes and no, for I will argue 
that what looks like a performative contradiction may 
well dissipate if one considers revisions in operative 
notions of matter, life, self, self-interest, will, and 
agency” (2010: ix).
26. Bruining is drawing here on Wendy Brown.
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Chapter 10
Manifesting
Tom Cohen suggests that in the Anthropocene era 
“writing practices might be apprehended in their 
interweave with carbon and hydro-carbon accelera-
tions, from a position beyond mourning and the autom-
atisms of personification, or ‘identification’” (25). It is 
precisely in this affirmative spirit that I round off this 
book with a biopoetic manifesto for a minimal ethics 
against all odds, outlined in twenty-one theses: 
1. The universe is constantly unfolding but it also 
temporarily stabilizes into entities.
2. None of the entities in the universe are pre-
planned or necessary.
3. Humans are one class of entities in the uni-
verse, which is as accidental and transitory as 
any other class.
4. The differentiation between process and entity 
is a heuristic, but it allows us to develop a 
discourse about the world and about ourselves 
in that world.
5. The world is an imaginary name we humans 
give to the multitude of unfoldings of matter.
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6. Transitory stabilizations of matter do matter 
to us humans, but they do not all matter in 
the same way.
7. Ethics is a historically contingent human mode 
of becoming in the world—and of becoming 
different from the world.
8. Ethics is therefore stronger than ontology: 
it entails becoming-something in response 
to there being something else, even though 
this “something else” is only a temporary 
stabilization.
9. This response is not just discursive but also 
affective and corporeal. 
10. Ethics is necessary because it is inevitable: we 
humans must respond to there being other 
processes and other entities in the world.
11. Our response is a way of taking responsibility 
for the multiplicity of the world, and for our 
relations to and with it.
12. Such responsibility can always be denied or 
withdrawn, but a response will have already 
taken place nonetheless.
13. Responsibility is not just a passive reaction to 
pre-existing reality: it involves actively making 
cuts into the ongoing unfolding of matter in 
order to stabilize it.
14. Material in-cisions undertaken by humans can 
be ethical de-cisions, even if the majority of 
such cuts into matter are nothing of the kind.
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15. Even if ethics is inevitable, ethical 
events are rare.
16. Ethics requires an account of itself.
17. Ethics precedes politics but also makes a 
demand on the political as the historically 
specific order of sometimes collaborative and 
sometimes competitive relations between 
human and nonhuman entities.
18. As a practice of material and conceptual differ-
entiation, ethics entails violence, but it should 
also work towards minimizing violence.
19. There is therefore value in ethics, even if ethics 
itself needs no prior values.
20. Ethics is a critical mobilization of the creative 
principle of life in order to facilitate a good life.
21. Ethics enables the production of better modes 
of becoming, whose goodness is worked out 
by humans in the political realm, in relation 
with, and with regard to, non-human entities 
and entanglements.
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Topia daedala, 2014
The series of images included in the book continues 
my visual exploration of various forms of manufac-
tured landscape. Taken from two vantage points on 
both sides of a window, the composite images inter-
weave human and nonhuman creativity by overlay-
ing the outer world of cloud formation with the inner 
space of sculptural arrangement. Remediating the tra-
dition of the sublime as embraced by J.M.W. Turner’s 
landscape paintings and Ansel Adams’ national park 
photographs, the series foregrounds the inherent 
constructedness of what counts as “landscape” and of 
the conventions of its visual representation. Through 
this, Topia daedala performs a micro-sublime for the 
Anthropocene era, a period in which the human has 
become identified as a geological agent. It also raises 
questions for the role of plastic—as both construc-
tion material and debris—in the age of petrochem-
ical urgency.
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